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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have emerged as an 
important and new area in wireless and mobile computing research 
because of their numerous potential applications that range from 
indoor deployment scenarios in home and office to outdoor 
deployment in adversary’s territory in a tactical battleground. Since 
in many WSN applications, lives and livelihoods may depend on 
the timeliness and correctness of sensor data obtained from 
dispersed sensor nodes, these networks must be secured to prevent 
any possible attacks that may be launched on them. Security is, 
therefore, an important issue in WSNs. However, this issue 
becomes even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks 
(CWSNs), a type of WSNs in which the sensor nodes have the 
capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters 
according to the radio environment under which they operate in 
order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum 
utilization of the network resources. This survey paper presents a 
comprehensive discussion on various security issues in CWSNs by 
identifying numerous security threats in these networks and defense 
mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of 
attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on 
their natures and targets, and corresponding to each attack class, 
appropriate security mechanisms are presented. The paper also 
identifies some open problems in this emerging area of wireless 
networking research.    
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user, secondary user, dynamic spectrum access (DSA), primary user 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have 
attracted a lot of interest in the research community due to 
their wide range of potential applications. A WSN consists of 
hundreds or even thousands of small devices each with 
sensing, processing, and communication capabilities to 
monitor a real-world environment. They are envisioned to 
play an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging from 
critical military surveillance applications to forest fire 
monitoring and building security monitoring (Akyildiz et al., 
2002). Most of the WSN deployments operate in the 
unlicensed ISM bands (2.4GHz). Several other small range 
wireless protocols like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth etc. also use the 
same band. This has led to overcrowding in this band with 
the increasing deployment of WSN-based applications. As a 
result, coexistence issues in the ISM bands have attracted 
extensive research attention (Howitt & Gutierrez, 2003; 
Cavalcanti et al., 2007). 
The increasing demand for spectrum in wireless 
communication has made efficient spectrum utilization a big 
challenge. To address this important requirement, cognitive 
radio (CR) has emerged as the key technology. A CR is an 
intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its 
surrounding environment, and adapts its internal parameters 
to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum 
utilization of the resources (Mitola, 2000). 
With the advent of CR technology, we have a different 
perspective of the traditional WSNs. In the current cognitive 
wireless sensor networks (CWSNs), the nodes change their 
transmission and reception parameters according to the radio 
environment. Cognitive capabilities are based on four 
activities: (i) monitoring of spectrum sensing, (ii) analysis 
and characterization of the environment, (iii) optimization of 
the best communication strategy based on different 
constraints such as reliability, power, security and privacy 
issues etc., and (iv) adaptation and collaboration strategy. 
The cognitive technology will not only enable access to new 
spectrum but it will also provide better propagation 
characteristics leading to reduction in power consumption, 
network life-time and reliability in a WSN. With cognitive 
capabilities, WSNs will be capable of finding a free channel 
in the unlicensed band to transmit or could find a free 
channel in the licensed band for communication. A CWSN, 
therefore, will be able to provide access not only to new 
spectrum bands in addition to the available 2.4 GHz band, 
but also to the spectrum band that has better propagation 
characteristics. If a channel in a lower frequency band is 
accessed, it will certainly allow communications with higher 
transmission range in a CWSN, and hence fewer sensor 
nodes will be required to provide coverage in a specific area 
with a higher network life-time due to lower energy 
consumption in the nodes. CWNs will also provide better 
propagation characteristics by adaptively changing system 
parameters like modulation schemes, transmit power, carrier 
frequency and constellation size. The result will be a more 
reliable communication with reduced power consumption, 
increased network life-time and higher reliability and 
enhanced quality of service (QoS) guarantee to applications.  
Although there are several advantages and benefits that 
can be achieved by deploying CWSNs (Cavalcanti et al., 
2008), guaranteeing security poses a significant challenge. 
Unless these challenges are solved to an effective level, 
deployment of CWSNs in real-world applications may face a 
serious impediment. As observed in (Burbank, 2008), the CR 
nature of a system introduces an entirely new gamut of 
threats and vulnerabilities that cannot be easily mitigated. 
The three salient characteristics of CR are its environmental 
awareness, learning and acting capabilities. Considering 
these characteristics from an attacker’s perspective, a CWSN 
will provide much more capability to an attacker to launch 
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attacks that are long-lasting and catastrophic in nature and 
those which can be triggered by simple spectral 
manipulations (Araujo, et al., 2012).   
Security had already been an extensive area of research in 
WSNs (Sen, 2009; Du & Chen, 2008; Walters et al., 2006; 
Yong et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2008; Martins & Guyennet, 
2010). With the advent of CWSNs and the perspective of 
security taking a much wider and complicated scope, it is 
obvious that research on the security aspects on CWSNs will 
attract even more attention of the research community. At 
present, however, despite considerable amount of ongoing 
research on CR networks (Clancy & Goergen, 2008), and the 
new interest in CWSNs (Zahmati et al., 2009) security in 
CWSNs has been a vastly unexplored area. Preservation of 
sensor data privacy is also a critical issue when these 
networks are deployed for applications that deal with 
sensitive and critical data.  
This paper provides a panoramic view of the security and 
privacy-related issues in WSNs with a particular focus on 
CWSNs. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a brief discussion on various security and 
privacy issues in a traditional WS, which are applicable to 
CWSNs as well. Section 3 discusses some of the security and 
defense mechanisms for tackling these vulnerabilities. In 
Section 4, we discuss security vulnerabilities which are 
specific to CWSNs. Section 5 presents some of attacks on 
CWSNs based on the current state of the art. In Section 6, we 
discuss various security mechanisms for defending against 
attacks on CWSNs. Section 7 identifies some future research 
challenges on security and privacy issues in CWSNs. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes the paper.   
2. Security and Privacy Issues in WSNs 
Traditional WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. 
These attacks can be broadly categorized into the following 
types (Shi & Perrig, 2004): 
Attacks on secrecy and authentication: standard 
cryptographic mechanisms can prevent attacks on the secrecy 
and authenticity of the messages from outsider attacks such 
as eavesdropping, packet replay attacks, and modification or 
spoofing of packets. 
Attacks on network availability: these attacks are more 
generally known as the denial of service (DoS) attacks and 
they can be launched on any layer of the communication 
protocol stack. 
Stealthy attacks against service integrity: in these attacks, 
the goal of the attackers is to lure the network accept a false 
data value. For example, an attacker compromises a sensor 
node and injects a false data value through that sensor node.  
In the following, we discuss various types of attacks in 
detail. First, we describe various ways in which the DoS 
attacks can be launched on a traditional WSN. In section 4 
we present various possible attacks on CWSNs. It must be 
understood, however, that all vulnerabilities of traditional 
WSNs are applicable to CWSNs as well. 
2.1   Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
Wood et al. define a DoS attack as an event that diminishes 
or attempts to reduce the capacity of network to perform its 
desired function (Wood & Stankovic, 2002).  In the 
following, we describe how DoS attacks can be launched in 
the different layers of the communication protocol stack in a 
traditional WSNs. 
2.1.1   DoS attacks on the physical layer 
The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, 
carrier frequency generation, signal detection, modulation, 
and data encryption (Akyildiz et al., 2002). Jamming in the 
physical layer is the most usual way to launch a DoS attack. 
In the jamming attack, the attacker interferes with the radio 
frequencies that the nodes in a WSN use for communication 
(Wood & Stankovic, 2002; Shi & Perrig, 2004). The 
jamming attack is extremely catastrophic. Even with a less 
powerful jamming source, an adversary can potentially 
disrupt communication in an entire network by strategically 
distributing the sources of the jamming signal.  
2.1.2   DoS attacks on the link layer 
The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of data streams, 
data frame detection, medium access control, and error 
control (Akyildiz et al., 2002). The attacks launched on this 
layer usually create collisions, resource exhaustion, and 
unfairness in allocation. A collision occurs when two nodes 
attempt to transmit simultaneously on the same frequency. 
An adversary may strategically cause collisions in specific 
packets such as ACK control messages. A possible result of 
such collisions is the costly exponential back-off. Repeated 
collisions of frames may lead to resource exhaustion in the 
sensor nodes (Wood & Stankovic, 2002).  
2.1.3   DoS attacks on the network layer 
The network layer of traditional WSNs is vulnerable to 
different types of attacks such as spoofed routing 
information, selective packet forwarding, sinkhole, Sybil, 
wormhole, blackhole, grayhole, HELLO flood, Byzantine, 
information disclosure, and acknowledgment spoofing. In the 
spoofed routing information attack, an attacker targets the 
routing information in the network by spoofing, altering or 
replaying the routing information to disrupt the traffic in the 
network (Hoffstein et al., 1998). The disruptions include 
creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling the network 
traffic from selected nodes, extending or shortening the 
source routes, generating fake error messages, causing 
network partitioning, and increasing the end-to-end latency. 
In the selective forwarding attack, the attacker compromises 
a node in such a way that it selectively forwards some 
messages and drops the others (Wang et al., 2009a). In a 
sinkhole attack, an attacker makes a compromised node more 
attractive to its neighbors by forging routing information 
(Wood & Stankovic, 2002; Karlof & Wagner, 2003; 
Newsome et al., 2004). The result is that the neighbor nodes 
choose the compromised nodes as the next-hop node to route 
their data through. This type of attack makes selective 
forwarding very simple as all traffic from a large area in the 
network flows through the compromised node. In the Sybil 
attack, a malicious node presents more than one identity in a 
network. This attack is particularly effective on routing 
algorithms, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, 
and misbehavior detection. For instance, in a sensor network 
voting scheme, a Sybil attack might utilize multiple identities 
to generate additional “votes”. Similarly, to attack a routing 
protocol, the Sybil attack can rely on a malicious node taking 
on the identities of multiple nodes and routing packets 
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through a single malicious node. In the wormhole attack, a 
pair of malicious nodes first creates a wormhole. A wormhole 
is a low-latency link between two portions of a network over 
which one attacker node replays messages to the other 
attacker node (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). This link may be 
established either by a single node forwarding messages 
between two adjacent but otherwise non-neighboring nodes 
or by a pair of nodes in different parts of a network 
communicating with each other. The latter case is closely 
related to the sinkhole attack as an attacking node near the 
base station can provide a one-hop link to that base station 
via the other attacking node in a distant part of the network. 
In the blackhole attack, a malicious node falsely advertises 
good paths (e.g., the shortest path or the most stable path) to 
the destination node during the path-finding process in 
reactive routing protocols, or in the route update messages in 
proactive routing protocols. The intention of the malicious 
node could be to hinder the path-finding process or to 
intercept all data packets sent to the concerned destination 
node. A more delicate form of this attack is known as the 
grayhole attack, in which the malicious node intermittently 
drops data packets thereby making its detection more 
difficult. In an HELLO flood attack, an attacker may use a 
high-powered transmitter to fool a large number of nodes and 
make them believe that they are within its neighborhood 
(Karlof & Wagner, 2003). Subsequently, the attacker node 
falsely broadcasts a shorter route to the base station and all 
the nodes that received the HELLO packets attempt to 
transmit to the attacker node. However, since these nodes are 
out of the radio range of the attacker, no communication will 
be established. In the Byzantine attack, a single compromised 
node or a set of compromised nodes works in collusion and 
carries out attacks by creating routing loops, forwarding 
packets through suboptimal routes, and selectively dropping 
packets (Awerbuch et al., 2002). These attacks are very 
difficult to detect since under such attacks, the networks 
usually do not exhibit any abnormal behavior. In an 
information disclosure attack, a compromised node leaks 
confidential or important information to unauthorized nodes 
in the network. Such information may include information 
regarding the network topology, geographic location of 
nodes, or optimal routes to authorized nodes in the network. 
In resource depletion attack, a malicious node attempts to 
deplete resources of other nodes in the network. The typical 
resources that are targeted are battery power, bandwidth, and 
computational power. The attacks could also be in the form 
of unnecessary requests for routes, very frequent generation 
of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets to other 
nodes. The acknowledgment spoofing attack is launched on 
routing algorithms that require transmission of 
acknowledgment packets. An attacking node may overhear 
packet transmissions from its neighboring nodes and spoof 
the acknowledgments, thereby providing false information to 
the nodes (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). In this way, the attacker 
is able to disseminate wrong information in the network 
about the status of the nodes, since acknowledgments may 
arrive from nodes that are not alive in reality. 
In addition to the aforementioned categories of attacks, 
various other types of attacks are possible on the routing 
protocols in WSNs. Most of the routing protocols in WSNs 
are vulnerable to attacks such as routing table overflows, 
routing table poisoning, packet replication, route cache 
poisoning, and rushing attacks. A comprehensive discussion 
on these attacks may be found in (Sen, 2010a). 
 
Table 1. Various types of DoS attacks and their possible 
countermeasures in WSNs  
 
 
  
2.1.4   DoS attacks on the transport layer 
The attacks that can be launched on the transport layer of a 
WSN communication protocol stack are the flooding attack 
and the desynchornization attack. If a protocol needs to 
maintain the state information at either end of an established 
connection, it becomes vulnerable to memory exhaustion 
attack (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). An attacker may 
repeatedly make new connection requests until the resources 
required by each connection are exhausted or reach a 
maximum limit. In either case, further legitimate requests are 
ignored by the victim node.  
The desynchornization attack, on the other hand, attempts 
to disrupt an existing connection (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). 
An attacker may, for example, repeatedly spoof messages to 
an end host causing the host to request retransmission of 
missed frames. If timed correctly, an attacker may degrade or 
even prevent the ability of end hosts to successfully exchange 
data, causing them to waste energy instead of attempting to 
recover from errors that never really exist. The possible DoS 
attacks on WSNs and their corresponding countermeasures 
are listed in Table 1. 
2.1.5   Attacks on secrecy and authentication 
There are different types of attacks under this category. We 
mention only the node replication attack. A more detailed 
discussion can be found in (Sen, 2009). 
Node replication attack: In this attack, the attacker 
attempts to add a node to an existing WSN by replicating (i.e. 
illegally copying) the node identifier of an already existing 
node in the network (Parno et al., 2005). A node replicated 
and joined in the network in this manner can potentially 
cause severe disruption in message communication in the 
WSN by corrupting the packets and forwarding them to 
wrong routes. This may also lead to network partitioning and 
communication of false sensor readings. In addition, if the 
attacker gains a physical access to the network, it is possible 
for him/her to copy the cryptographic keys and use these keys 
for message communication from the replicated node. The 
attacker may also place the replicated node in strategic 
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locations in the network so that he/she could easily 
manipulate a specific segment of the network, possibly 
causing a network partitioning.  
2.1.6   Attacks on sensor data privacy 
Since in many applications WSNs are deployed for automatic 
data collection through efficient and strategic deployment of 
the sensor nodes, these networks are vulnerable to potential 
abuse of the collected data. Privacy preservation of sensitive 
data in WSNs is a particularly difficult challenge (Gruteser et 
al., 2003). Moreover, an adversary may gather seemingly 
innocuous data to derive sensitive information if he or she 
knows how the aggregate data is collected from multiple 
sensor nodes. This is analogous to the “panda hunter 
problem”, in which the hunter can accurately estimate the 
location of the panda by systematically monitoring the traffic 
(Ozturk et al., 2004). Some of the common attacks on sensor 
data privacy (Gruteser et al., 2003; Chan & Perrig, 2003) are 
briefly discussed in the following.  
• Eavesdropping and passive monitoring: The most 
common form of attack on sensor data privacy is carried 
out by an attacker by silently listening to the messages 
communicated over the network. If the messages are not 
protected using cryptographic mechanisms, the 
adversary can easily understand their contents.  
• Traffic analysis: In order to launch an attack on privacy, 
an attacker sometimes combines passive eavesdropping 
with an active traffic analysis. Through an effective 
analysis of traffic, an adversary can identify some sensor 
nodes with special roles and activities in a WSN.  
• Camouflage: In camouflage attack, an adversary 
compromises a sensor node and later on uses the victim 
node to masquerade as a normal node in the network. 
This camouflaged node may advertise false routing 
information and attract packets from other nodes for 
further forwarding. After the packets start arriving at the 
compromised node, it starts forwarding them to strategic 
nodes where privacy analysis of the packets may be 
carried out systematically.  
3. Security Mechanisms in Traditional WSNs  
Numerous security mechanisms have been proposed by the 
researchers for defending against the possible attacks on 
WSNs. In the following, we provide a very brief discussion 
on some of the well known defense mechanisms for WSNs 
without aiming to present a comprehensive discussion on any 
of these schemes. Interested readers may refer to (Sen, 2009) 
for a detailed discussion.   
3.1   Applications of cryptographic mechanisms 
Since most of the security mechanisms for WSNs use 
cryptography, selecting the most appropriate cryptographic 
mechanism is a critical issue. The cryptographic algorithms 
and protocols must meet the constraints of the sensor nodes 
and should be evaluated by their code sizes, data sizes, 
processing time, and computational power requirements. It 
was popular belief for long that the code size, processing 
time, and power requirements of the public key algorithms 
such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (Malan et al., 
2004) or RSA signatures (Rivest et al., 1978) are too high for 
WSN nodes. However, subsequent studies have shown that it 
is feasible to apply public key cryptography in WSNs by 
right selection of algorithms and associated parameters, 
optimization, and the use of low-power techniques (Gura et 
al., 2004; Gaubatz et al., 2004; Wander et al., 2005). For 
example, the public key algorithms like Rabin’s scheme 
(Rabin, 1979), Ntru-Encrypt (Hoffstein et al., 1998), RSA 
(Rivest et al., 1978), and the elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC) (Miller, 1986; Kobiltz, 1987) are all found to be 
feasible in WSN applications. ECC is particularly suitable for 
WSNs since it provides the same level of security as the RSA 
algorithm with a far smaller key size, thereby reducing the 
processing and communication overhead. In general, 
however, the private key operations in the public key 
cryptographic schemes are still expensive and most of the 
private key-related operations are assumed to be either 
carried out by the base stations or on some selected sensor 
nodes which have higher computational resources (Malan et 
al., 2004; Rivest et al., 1978; Brown et al., 2000; Gura et al., 
2004; Gaubatz et al., 2004). Symmetric key-based protocols 
such as RC4 (Menezes et al., 1996), RC5 (Rivest, 1995), 
IDEA (Menezes et al., 1996), SHA-1 (Eastlake & Jones, 
2001) and MD5 (Menezes et al., 1996; Rivest, 1992) are also 
widely used for ensuring message authentication, 
confidentiality, and integrity in WSNs.  
3.2   Key management protocols 
Since the existence of a robust and efficient key management 
protocol is an essential pre-requirement for successful 
operation of a cryptographic mechanism, design of attack-
resilient key management schemes that meet the resource 
constraints in such networks is a challenging task. The goal 
of key management is to establish keys among the nodes in a 
secure and reliable manner and to support node addition and 
revocation. Due to the high computational overhead of most 
of the public key cryptosystems, majority of the existing key 
management schemes for WSNs are based on symmetric key 
cryptography (Sen, 2009). A large number of key 
management protocols for WSNs have been proposed by the 
researchers. A comprehensive discussion on key management 
in WSNs can be found in (Sen, 2009).   
3.3   Defense mechanisms against DoS attacks 
Since DoS attacks can be launched at different layers of the 
protocol stack, the defense mechanisms at different layers 
follow different approaches.   
In the physical layer, jamming attack can be defended by 
employing variations of spread-spectrum communications 
such as frequency hopping and code spreading (Wood & 
Stankovic, 2002). In frequency-hopping spread spectrum 
(FHSS), signals are transmitted by rapidly switching a carrier 
among many frequency channels using a pseudo-random 
sequence that is known to both the transmitter and the 
receiver. As a potential attacker would not be able to predict 
the frequency selection sequence, it will be impossible for 
him/her to jam the frequency being used at a given point of 
time. Another approach for handling jamming attacks in 
WSN is to tolerate the attacks by correctly identifying the 
jammed part of the network and effectively avoiding the 
nodes in the affected part by routing messages around it. 
Wood et al. (Wood & Stankovic, 2002) have proposed an 
approach in which nodes along the perimeter of a jammed 
region report their status to their neighbors and the affected 
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region is identified collectively and packets are routed 
around it.  
In the link layer, frame collision attacks are handled by 
using error-correcting codes (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). The 
resource (i.e., energy) exhaustion attacks are prevented by 
applying rate-limiting admission control mechanism in the 
medium access control (MAC) layer so that the requests from 
nodes that intend to exhaust the energy-reserves of a node are 
rejected. Use of time-division multiplexing is another 
approach to defend against energy exhaustion attacks (Wood 
& Stankovic, 2002). Time-division multiplexing eliminates 
the need of arbitration for each frame and solves the 
indefinite postponement problem in a back-off algorithm. 
The adverse impact of unfairness caused by an attacker who 
intermittently launches link layer attacks can be mitigated by 
the use of small frames since it reduces the amount of time an 
attacker gets to capture the communication channel (Wood & 
Stankovic, 2002). However, this technique often reduces the 
throughput and it is susceptible to further unfairness if that 
attacker tries to retransmit quickly instead of randomly 
delaying his/her retransmission attempt.  
3.4   Defense against attacks on the routing protocols 
Numerous mechanisms exist for defending attacks on the 
network layer and on the routing protocols of WSNs. Since a 
detailed discussion of these schemes is beyond the scope of 
this paper, we provide only a very brief discussion on some 
of the current and popular mechanisms. A detailed discussion 
can be found in (Sen, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the wormhole attack launched by 
nodes M1 and M2 in a WSN. 
 
A popular way to prevent spoofing and alteration of the 
routing packets is to append a message authentication code 
(MAC) to the routing packets. To defend against replayed 
information, counters or time-stamps are used in the 
messages (Perrig et al., 2002). Selective forwarding (or 
selective packet dropping) attacks may be prevented using 
multipath routing (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). Hu et al. have 
proposed a mechanism called “packet leashes” for detecting 
and defending against wormhole attacks (Hu et al., 2003). As 
shown in Figure 1, in a wormhole attack, two or more 
malicious nodes collude together by establishing a tunnel 
using an efficient communication medium (i.e., a wired link 
or a high-speed wireless connection). During the route 
discovery phase, the route request messages are forwarded 
between the malicious nodes using the established tunnel. 
Therefore, the request message that reaches first at the 
destination node is the one that is forwarded by the malicious 
nodes. Consequently, the malicious nodes are added in the 
path from the source to the destination. Once the malicious 
nodes are included in the routing path, the malicious nodes 
either drop all the packets, resulting in complete denial of 
service, or drop the packets selectively to avoid detection. 
Sen et al. present a cooperative detection scheme that 
exploits the redundancy in routing information in an ad hoc 
network to build a robust detection framework for identifying 
malicious packet dropping nodes (Sen et al., 2007a). In (Sen 
et al., 2007b), a cooperative grayhole attack detection 
mechanism is proposed that utilizes a robust distributed 
collaborative algorithm among the nodes in an ad hoc 
network. Di Pietro et al. propose a mechanism for securing 
group communications in WSNs (Di Pietro et al., 2003). The 
protocol is known as LKHW (Logical Key Hierarchy for 
Wireless sensor networks) and it is based on   directed 
diffusion-based multicast mechanism. For its operation, the 
protocol deploys a logical hierarchy that has a central key 
distributor at the root of the tree and the nodes in the WSN 
are the leaf level. The internal nodes of the tree contain keys 
that are used in the rekeying process. Using the directed 
diffusion approach (Intanagonwiwat et al., 2000), data 
dissemination in the network is done in an efficient manner. 
Lazos et al. propose a similar tree-based key distribution 
scheme in which a routing tree is constructed with the leaf 
nodes having the keys assigned to them and the nodes at the 
intermediate levels of the tree acting as the relay nodes 
(Lazos & Poovendran, 2002).  
As discussed earlier in this section, most of the routing 
protocols for WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks 
such as: selective forwarding, sinkhole, blackhole, grayhole 
etc. For a detailed discussion on these attacks and a 
comparative analysis of some of the well-known secure 
routing protocols for WSNs, the readers may refer to (Sen, 
2010a). In the following, we briefly discuss a few well known 
secure routing algorithms used in WSNs. 
Liu & Ning propose a protocol called µTESLA– micro 
version of the time, efficient, streaming, loss-tolerant 
authentication protocol- for providing broadcast 
authentication in WSNs (Liu & Ning, 2003; Liu & Ning, 
2004). The protocol introduces an asymmetry through a 
delayed disclosure of the symmetric keys, leading to an 
efficient broadcast authentication scheme. To bootstrap a 
new receiver, the protocol depends on a point-to-point 
authentication mechanism in which the receiver sends a 
request message to the base station and the base station 
replies with a message containing all the necessary 
parameters. Since the base station needs to unicast the initial 
parameters to the individual sensor nodes, a long delay is 
introduced during network bootstrapping in a large network. 
Liu et al. have proposed a multi-level key chain scheme for 
broadcast authentication to overcome this problem (Liu & 
Ning, 2003; Liu & Ning, 2004).  
Zhu et al. propose a scheme known as LEAP (Localized 
Encryption and Authentication Protocol) that is based on 
construction of a one-way key-chain for one-hop broadcast 
authentication (Zhu et al., 2003). In this scheme, each node 
generates a one-way key chain of certain length and transmits 
the first key of the key chain to each of its neighbor 
encrypting it with their pair-wise shared keys. Whenever a 
node sends a message, it attaches the next authenticated key. 
The authenticated keys are disclosed in reverse order to their 
generation.  
Deng et al. propose an “intrusion-tolerant routing protocol 
in wireless sensor networks” (INSENS) that adopts a routing-
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based approach to security in WSNs (Deng et al., 2002; Deng 
et al., 2003). INSENS operates in two phases: (1) route 
discovery and (2) data forwarding. During the route 
discovery phase, the base station sends a request message to 
all the nodes. Each node receiving a request message records 
the identity of the sender and sends the message to all its 
immediate neighbors. The nodes respond with their local 
topology by sending feedback messages. The integrity of the 
messages is protected using encryption by a shared key 
mechanism. A malicious node can inflict damage only by not 
forwarding packets, but the messages are sent through 
different neighbors; so, it is likely that a message reaches a 
node by at a least one path. Hence, the effect of malicious 
nodes is not totally eliminated but is restricted to only a few 
downstream nodes in the worst case. Finally, the base station 
computes two independent routing paths for each node from 
the base station and sends the path information to each node. 
The second phase of data forwarding takes place based on 
the forwarding tables computed by the base station.  
A suite of security protocols called “SPINS” for WSNs 
have been proposed in (Perrig et al., 2002). SPINS consists 
of two building blocks: (1) secure network encryption 
protocol (SNEP) and (2) the µTESLA protocol. While SNEP 
provides data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, 
and data freshness for peer-to-peer communication, µTESLA 
is a broadcast authentication mechanism.   
Du et al. investigate the possible use of public key 
cryptography (Gura et al., 2004; Gaubatz et al., 2004; 
Wander et al., 2005; Hankerson et al., 2004) in designing 
secure routing protocols for WSNs (Du et al., 2005b). The 
proposed scheme avoids expensive signature verification by 
using a light-weight one-way hash function for public key 
authentication. However, it requires the hash values to be 
distributed in the sensor nodes during the pre-distribution 
phase which leads to a scalability problem in a large-scale 
network.  
Tanachaiwiwat et al. propose a secure routing protocol 
called “trusted routing for location aware sensor networks” 
(TRANS) that uses a symmetric key cryptographic scheme 
based on loose-time synchronization mechanism to ensure 
message confidentiality (Tanachaiwiwat et al., 2003).  
Papadimitratos et al. have proposed a secure route discovery 
protocol that guarantees correct topology discovery in a 
WSN (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002; Papadimitratos & Haas, 
2006). The protocol relies on the use of MAC and an 
accumulation of the node identities along the route traversed 
by a message so that a source node can discover the network 
topology as each node along the route from the source to the 
destination appends its identity to the message.   
3.5   Defense against attacks on the transport layer 
For defending against the flooding DoS attacks at the 
transport layer, Aura et al. propose the use of “client puzzles” 
(Aura et al., 2001). In client puzzle-based schemes, each 
client has to demonstrate its commitment to the connection 
by solving a puzzle before it can access any resource in a 
server. Since an attacker does not have infinite resources, it 
will be impossible for him/her to create new connections fast 
enough to cause resource starvation on the serving node.  A 
possible defense against desynchornization attacks is to 
enforce a mandatory requirement of authentication of all 
packets communicated between the nodes (Wood & 
Stankovic, 2002). If the authentication mechanism is secure, 
an attacker will be unable to inject any spoofed message.  
3.6   Defense against the Sybil attack 
A defense mechanism against the Sybil attack must ensure 
that a framework is in place that can validate a particular 
identity is only being held by a given physical node 
(Newsome et al., 2004). Random key pre-distribution 
techniques (Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002; Chan et al. 2003; 
Du et al., 2005a) can effectively be used to defend against the 
Sybil attack. In random key pre-distribution, a random set of 
keys or key-related information is assigned to each sensor 
node so that in the key setup phase, each node can discover 
or compute the common keys shared by it with its neighbors. 
The common keys are used as shared secret session keys to 
ensure node-to-node secrecy.   
3.7   Defense against node replication attack 
Parno et al. propose a mechanism for distributed detection of 
node replication attacks in WSNs (Parno et al., 2005). In 
their proposition, the authors have presented two algorithms- 
(i) randomized multicast and (ii) line-selected multicast – 
both of which are based on collaborative participation of 
multiple sensor nodes. The randomized multicast algorithm 
distributes location information of a node to randomly 
selected witnesses and exploits the birthday paradox to 
detect replicated nodes. The line-selected multicast algorithm 
is based on rumor routing (Braginsky & Estrin, 2002), and it 
uses network topology-related information to detect node 
replication. Line-selected multicast has lower communication 
overhead than randomized multicast. 
3.8   Defense against the traffic analysis attack 
Deng et al. propose a mechanism for defending against traffic 
analysis attacks in WSN (Deng et al., 2005a).  The authors 
have identified two different classes of traffic analysis 
attacks: (1) rate monitoring attack and (2) time correlation 
attack. In rate monitoring attack, an adversary first monitors 
the packet sending rate of the nodes in its neighborhood, and 
then moves closer to the nodes that have a higher packet 
sending rate. In a time correlation attack, the adversary 
observes the correlation in sending times between a node and 
its neighbor node that is assumed to be forwarding the same 
packet and deduces the path by following each forwarding 
operation as the packet propagates towards the base station. 
The defense mechanism proposed by Deng et al is able to 
defend against both these attacks (Deng et al., 2005a).   
3.9   Defense against attacks on sensor data privacy 
Since protection of privacy of sensitive data in the sensor 
nodes in WSNs is an important requirement in many 
applications, several schemes for this purpose have been 
proposed by the researchers. These schemes can be broadly 
divided into three categories: (1) anonymity schemes, (2) 
policy-based schemes, and (3) schemes based on information 
flooding.  
An anonymity scheme depersonalizes the data before it is 
released from its source. Gruteser et al. present an analysis on 
the feasibility of anonymizing location information in 
location-based services in an automotive telematics 
environment (Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003). Beresford et al. 
propose various anonymity techniques for an indoor location 
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system based on the Active Bat (Beresford & Stajano, 2003). 
Sen proposes an efficient and reliable routing protocol for 
wireless ad hoc and mesh networks for protecting user 
privacy while providing robust authentication for the users 
(Sen, 2010b). The scheme is based on the Rivest’s ring 
signature scheme (Rivest et al., 2001).  
In policy-based defense mechanisms, decisions on access 
control and authentication are made on the basis of a 
specified set of privacy policies. Molnar et al. present the 
concept of private authentication and demonstrate its 
application in the radio frequency identification (RFID) 
domain (Molnar & Wagner, 2004). Duri et al. propose a 
policy-based framework for protecting sensor information in 
which a computer inside a car acts as a trusted agent for 
ensuring location privacy (Duri et al., 2000). Myles et al. 
describe the architecture of a centralized location server that 
controls access requests from client applications through a set 
of validator modules based on a set of XML-coded privacy 
policies (Myles et al., 2003). Hengartner et al. discuss 
various challenges that arise in designing the specification 
and implementation of policies that control access to location 
information, and present a framework of an access control 
mechanism (Hengartner & Steenkiste, 2003).  
Use of information flooding is a popular approach to 
achieve privacy in communication. Ozturk et al. propose 
various modifications to WSN routing protocols for 
protecting the location information of a source node by using 
randomized data routing and a phantom traffic generation 
mechanism (Ozturk et al., 2004). Phantom flooding entices 
an attacker away from the real source towards a fake source 
called the “phantom source”. Deng et al. address the problem 
of defending a base station against physical attacks by 
concealing the geographic location of the base station (Deng 
et al., 2005b). Xi et al. propose a successful attack on the 
flooding-based phantom routing approach presented by 
Ozturk et al  (Ozturk et al., 2004) and describe “greedy 
random walk” (GROW) protocol to reduce the chance of an 
eavesdropper successfully collecting the communicated 
location information (Xi et al., 2006). Li et al. propose a 
scheme that provides both content confidentiality and source-
location privacy using a two-phase routing mechanism (Li & 
Ren, 2009). In the first phase of routing, the source node 
randomly selects an intermediate node in its neighborhood 
and transmits the data packets to that node before it is routed 
to a ring node. This phase ensures protection of the source-
location privacy. To be written. In the second phase, the data 
packets are mixed with packets from other sources through a 
network mixing ring (NMR). This phase of routing provides 
source-location privacy at the network level. In order to 
provide high level protection to source-location privacy, it is 
possible to have multiple mixing rings in the routing process. 
However, use of multiple mixing rings leads to more energy 
consumption in the sensor nodes.  
3.10   Secure data aggregation 
In a WSN, certain nodes - called the “aggregators” - are 
responsible for carrying out data aggregation operations so as 
to optimize the utilization of precious bandwidth of the 
wireless links. If an aggregator node or a sensor node is 
compromised, it is easy for an adversary to inject false data 
into the network. In absence of a robust authentication 
mechanism, an attacker can fool the aggregators into 
reporting false data to the base station. For securing the 
aggregation process in WSNs, two broad categories of 
techniques are generally used: (1) plaintext-based protocols 
and (2) ciphertext-based protocols.  
The plaintext-based protocols operate on plaintext 
information while carrying out the aggregation operation. Hu 
et al. propose a secure aggregation protocol on plaintext data 
that uses the µTESLA (Hu & Evans, 2003). In the 
proposition, sensor nodes are organized into a tree in which 
the internal nodes act as the aggregators. However, the 
protocol fails if a parent and one of its child nodes are 
compromised. Chan et al. have presented a “secure 
information aggregation” (SIA) framework for sensor 
networks (Chan et al., 2007). Cam et al. propose an “energy-
efficient pattern-based data aggregation” (ESPDA) protocol 
for WSNs (Cam et al., 2005; Cam et al., 2006). Cam et al. 
have introduced another scheme – “secure differential data 
aggregation” (SDDA) -- which is based on pattern codes 
(Cam et al., 2004). SDDA transmits the differential data 
instead of the raw data and performs data aggregation on the 
pattern codes that represent the main characteristics of the 
sensed data. It also employs a sleep protocol to coordinate 
the activation of the sensing units in such a way that only one 
of the sensor nodes is activated at a given time for sensing 
operation. Du et al. propose a “witness-based data 
aggregation” (WDA) scheme for WSNs to ensure validation 
of data fusion nodes to the base station (Du et al., 2003). 
Wagner has studied secure data aggregation in WSNs and 
has proposed a mathematical framework for formally 
evaluating the strengths of their security (Wagner, 2004).  
Secure aggregation of ciphertext data in WSNs is required 
to preserve the privacy of sensor nodes in many applications 
(Acharya et al., 2005; Castelluccia et al., 2009; Girao et al., 
2005; He et al., 2007; Westhoff et al., 2006). As a key 
approach to fulfilling this requirement, “concealed data 
aggregation” (CDA) schemes are proposed in which multiple 
source nodes send encrypted data to a sink along a 
convergecast tree with aggregation of ciphertext being 
performed over the route (Acharya et al., 2005; Castelluccia 
et al., 2009; Girao et al., 2005; Westhoff et al., 2006; Peter et 
al., 2010). Two ciphertext-based secure data aggregation 
schemes are proposed by Castelluccia et al.  (Castelluccia et 
al., 2009) and Girao et al. (Girao et al., 2005). The 
propositions are based on a particular encryption 
transformation called “privacy homomorphism” (PH). A PH 
is an encryption transformation that allows direct 
computation on encrypted data.   
3.11   Defense against physical attacks on nodes 
The sensor nodes in a WSN can be protected against possible 
tampering by tamper-proofing the physical packages of the 
sensors (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). Propositions also have 
been made by researchers for building tamper-resistant 
hardware in order to make the memory contents on the sensor 
chips inaccessible to a potential external attacker (Anderson 
& Kuhn, 1996; Anderson & Kuhn, 1998; Komerling & 
Kuhn, 1999). Deng et al. propose various approaches for 
protecting sensors by deploying components outside them 
(Deng et al., 2005b). Sastry et al. present a protocol called 
“ECHO” that provides for secure and reliable location 
verification of the sensor nodes in a WSN (Sastry et al., 
2003). Deng et al. discuss various defense mechanisms 
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against search-based physical attacks (Deng et al., 2002). 
Wang et al. present a systematic modeling framework for 
“blind” physical attacks on WSNs (Wang et al., 2005). 
Seshadri et al. propose a mechanism called “software-based 
attestation for embedded devices” (SWATT) to detect a 
sudden and abrupt change in the memory content of a sensor 
node that indicates the possibility of an attack (Seshadri et 
al., 2004). 
3.12   Intrusion detection 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors a host or a 
network for suspicious activity patterns that are outside the 
normal and expected behavior (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). 
Research on intrusion detection in WSNs is still in its 
preliminary stage. Current research focuses on how to detect 
and eliminate injected false information.  
Brutch et al. discuss various types of possible attacks 
against WSNs and propose various architectures for intrusion 
detection systems (Brutch & Ko, 2003). Zhu et al. propose an 
interleaved hop-by-hop (IHOP) authentication scheme (Zhu 
et al. 2004b) which can guarantee that the base station will be 
able to detect any false injected data packets when no more 
than a certain number of nodes are compromised. Wang et al. 
propose a scheme to detect whether a node is faulty or 
malicious with the collaboration of its neighbor nodes (Wang 
et al., 2003). Albers et al. present an intrusion detection 
architecture based on a local IDS (LIDS) on each node in a 
wireless ad hoc network (Albers et al., 2002).  Sen proposes 
an intrusion detection architecture for an ad hoc network in 
detection activities are carried out locally in each cluster 
(Sen, 2010d). 
3.13   Trust management 
A popular approach to enforce a high-level of security in 
WSNs is to deploy trust- and reputation-based frameworks. 
Issues such as judging the quality and reliability of the sensor 
nodes and the wireless links, robustness of the data 
aggregation operation, correctness of the aggregator nodes, 
and timeliness in packet forwarding by the sensor nodes can 
be addressed very effectively with the help of trust-based 
systems. A comprehensive discussion on trust and reputation 
and various security mechanisms based on these concepts is 
given in (Sen, 2010c).  
Pirzada et al. propose an approach for building trust 
relationship between the nodes in an ad hoc network based 
on their packet forwarding behavior (Pirzada & McDonald, 
2004). Oram describes various methods of finding paths from 
a source node to a designated target node in a peer-to-peer 
computing paradigm (Oram, 2001). Extending this approach, 
Zhu et al. (Zhu et al., 2004a) provides a practical approach 
for computing trust in wireless networks.  
Sen proposes a trust-based secure and efficient searching 
scheme for peer-to-peer networks that utilizes topology 
adaptation by the trusted nodes (Sen, 2011). Yan et al. 
discuss a trust-based security framework to ensure data 
protection and secure routing in an ad hoc network (Yan et 
al., 2003). Ren et al. present a probabilistic approach to 
model a distributed trust framework for a large-scale ad hoc 
network (Ren et al., 2004).  
Ganeriwal et al. propose a reputation-based framework for 
high-integrity sensor networks using the beta distribution for 
reputation representation, updates and integration (Ganeriwal 
& Srivastava, 2004). Liang et al. present various models for 
evaluating the robustness of various aggregation algorithms 
which can be adapted for WSNs (Liang & Shi, 2005; Liang 
& Shi, 2008).   
4. Security Vulnerabilities in CWSNs  
In conventional WSNs, the transmission parameters can be 
changed and the radio frequency (RF) bands can be used in 
the limits which have been defined by pre-defined standards 
and spectrum regulations. Based on these specifications, the 
hardware and the firmware are implemented and they cannot 
be changed dynamically during the network communications. 
A cognitive wireless sensor network (CWSN), other hand, 
can communicate in a wide range of spectrum bands by 
changing its transmission parameters dynamically during 
network communication in response to the changes in the 
sensed radio spectrum environment and the signals received 
from other sensor nodes. This capability is gainfully utilized 
to realize innovative spectrum management approaches like 
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in which the allocation of 
spectrum bands to communication services can change with 
time or space.  
In most of the centralized and distributed approaches of 
DSA in CWNs, it is assumed that the participating nodes are 
altruistic and make logical decisions to optimize the use of 
the spectrum resources. However, such approaches make 
CWSNs vulnerable to security threats, where malicious 
cognitive radio nodes may exhibit selfish behavior or would 
disrupt the communication protocols and algorithms which 
are designed for optimal spectrum utilization. Identification 
of various possible attacks on CWSNs is critical so that the 
networks can be defended against those identified attacks by 
implementing appropriate security mechanisms. 
Masquerading is a very common attack on CWSNs in which 
a malicious cognitive radio node provides false information 
for the cognitive radio functions such as spectrum sensing or 
spectrum sharing. The malicious node can also inject false 
information on the spectrum environment into other CR 
nodes with the objective of gaining an unfair advantage or 
just disrupting the CWSN. This type of threat can affect both 
centralized and distributed CWSNs.  
 
 
Figure 2. Hidden node problem in a cognitive radio network 
 
A node may not always distribute incorrect or incomplete 
information about the spectrum environment with a malicious 
intention only. As shown in Figure 2, in case of the hidden 
node problem, two cognitive nodes may have a different 
perception of the spectrum because they are located in two 
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different locations and they detect different radio spectrum 
information. 
As in traditional WSNs, jamming is the most common 
DoS attack in CWSNs which can be used to disrupt the 
communications in a specific spectrum band, or make the 
management channels of the CWSN ineffective so that 
cognitive radio related messages cannot be distributed in the 
network. In addition to all the vulnerabilities in the traditional 
WSNs that we have discussed in Section 2 of this paper, 
CWSNs have many other security problems. Some of the 
attacks which could severely affect the operations in a 
CWSN are:  (i) attacks on the communication protocols, (ii) 
masquerading attacks, (iii) unauthorized access to the 
spectrum,  (iv) physical attacks on the sensor nodes, (v) 
internal failures of the sensor nodes, (vi) power exhaustion 
attacks on the sensor nodes, (vii) attacks on the objective 
functions of the cognitive engine, (viii) attacks on the 
administrative policies of the sensor nodes, (ix) attacks on the 
cryptographic protocols and security schemes implemented 
in the sensor nodes, and (x) attacks on the privacy of the 
sensor data. 
In the following, we briefly discuss the aforementioned 
threats and vulnerabilities in CWSNs.   
4.1   Attacks on the communication protocols 
The intention of these attacks is to disrupt the communication 
in a CWSN.  Attacks under this category are of various types 
such as: (i) replay attack, (ii) denial of service (DoS) attack, 
(iii) malicious alteration of the cognitive messages, (iv) Sybil 
attack, (v) hidden node problem, (vi) saturation of the 
cognitive control channels, (vii) eavesdropping of cognitive 
radio messages, (viii) disruption of the MAC, network layer, 
and cognitive engine of the cognitive radio network.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. An Illustration of MAC spoofing and a subsequent 
replay attack launched by a malicious node M 
 
In a replay attack (Raymond et al., 2007), the attacker 
replays messages from earlier sessions of communications in 
the network. This attack is illustrated in Figure 3.The attacker 
may also send the replayed messages to another node which 
is not the intended recipient of the message. The receiver of 
the message, on finding that it is not the intended recipient 
forwards the messages further so that the message ultimately 
reaches the actual destination node. However, the delayed 
messages can lead to spreading of false information, since 
based on this delay, various characteristics of the network 
such as channel quality, network topology, routing etc, are 
computed. Since the nodes in a CWSN share extensive 
information among each other about various aspects of the 
network, spreading of false information can cause more 
damage in a CWSN than in a traditional WSN. For example, 
if the packets from the primary users (PUs) in a CWSN are 
replayed, the secondary users (SUs) might have a wrong 
perspective of the spectrum as well. This will forbid the SUs 
from using the frequencies and the protocols used by the 
attacker resulting in a sub-optimal and inefficient use of the 
network resources. 
In a DoS attack, the attacker makes the resources in the 
network unavailable to its legitimate users. There are many 
different ways in which a DoS attack may be launched – (i) 
jamming attack, (ii) collision attack, (iii) routing disruption 
attack, (iv) flooding attack etc.  
In a jamming attack, the attacker transmits radio signals 
that interfere with the radio frequencies used by the nodes in 
a network. As discussed in Section 2, various ways of 
launching jamming attacks in WSNs and their defense 
mechanisms have been extensively studied by researchers 
over the last decade (Sun et al., 2007). In CWSNs, jamming 
attacks could be detrimental since it can rapidly exhaust the 
energies in the nodes and disrupt communication in the 
network. In a typical jamming attack in CWSN, a malicious 
node transmits signals at a high power using the PU 
frequency thereby disrupting the communication in the 
network. Jamming of the channels used to distribute 
cognitive messages in CWSNs is another serious threat. This 
attack can be launched against an out-of-bound cognitive 
control channel (CCC) or in-band CCC if the frequency of 
the channel is known.  
The objective of the collision attack is to violate the 
communication protocols used in CWSNs. While an attacker 
need not spend much energy in launching such an attack, the 
attack can cause serious damage in network services. Since 
the wireless medium is inherently broadcast in nature, 
detection of collision attacks and identification of the 
malicious nodes are non-trivial tasks. Since in CWSNs, the 
SUs share the spectrum, collision attack can easily and very 
effectively disrupt communications among the SUs. Hence, 
the collision attacks are more detrimental in CWSNs than in 
WSNs. In routing disruption attack, a malicious attacker 
does not forward the routing messages. The grayhole and the 
blackhole attacks are examples of these types of attacks. As 
already discussed in Section 2, these attacks are also possible 
in traditional WSNs. While in a grayhole attack, the attacker 
selectively drops routing messages, a blackhole node drops 
all routing packets arriving at it. These attacks not only cause 
serious disruptions in network communication, but also the 
spreading of routing misinformation may lead to network 
partitioning. In a flooding attack, a malicious node sends a 
number of fake connection requests to a target victim node 
resulting in resource depletion in the latter. 
In malicious alteration of cognitive message attack, the 
adversary intentionally changes the cognitive messages in the 
network so that correct information cannot be exchanged 
among the nodes.  
The Sybil attack is launched by an attacker node that can 
assume multiple identities. This type of attacks can cause 
routing disruption, and unfair resource allocation in a 
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resource sharing environment and in voting and reputation-
based systems. For instance, the Sybil attack may be 
launched by a malicious node to generate additional 
reputations for malicious nodes or to change the information 
about the sensed spectrum.   
The hidden node problem arises when a CR node is in the 
protection region of an incumbent node but it fails to detect 
the existence of the incumbent. For example, if a CR node 
does not sense the presence of a primary user base station 
(BS) because of an obstacle, it transmits in the same 
frequency bands of the primary user, causing harmful 
interference. Depending of their position, other CR terminals 
sense a different environment, and they can provide 
additional information to mitigate the threat.  
In the saturation of the cognitive control channel attack, 
the attacker launches a DoS attack against the cognitive 
control channel (CCC) by saturation – a large number of 
cognitive message are sent to the CCC to deny its service in 
the CWSN. However, some specific designs of the CCC may 
prevent this type of attack.  
In the eavesdropping of cognitive radio messages, the 
attacker passively listens to the cognitive messages, and 
subsequently uses the information contained on those 
messages to launch powerful attacks. 
In the attack involving disruption of the MAC, network 
layer, and the cognitive engine of a CWSN, the adversary 
attempts to target the protocols in the higher layers of the 
stack. 
4.2   Masquerading attacks 
This vulnerability involves the scenario in which a malicious 
adversary masquerades a primary user in a CWSN. The 
malicious attacker may mimic the primary user 
characteristics in a specific frequency band so that the 
legitimate secondary users erroneously identify the attacker 
as an incumbent and they avoid using that frequency band. 
This can be a selfish attack, because the attacker may 
subsequently use the frequency bands or launch a DoS attack 
to deny access to the spectrum resources to other secondary 
nodes in the CWSN. An example of the masquerading of a 
primary user in a CWSN is shown in Figure 4. A malicious 
CR node transmits a signal which is very similar to the 
primary user. On sensing this false signal, other CR nodes 
detect the presence of an additional primary user, and they 
avoid using the spectrum bands. In another form of a 
masquerading attack, a malicious CR node masquerades an 
honest node while collaborating with the other nodes in a 
CWSN to carry out important network functionalities such 
as: spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing, spectrum 
management, and handling of spectrum mobility. This form 
of an attack can be dangerous since the malicious node may 
spread false information about spectrum sharing while 
participating in the collaborative decision making processes 
in a CWSN. 
One type of masquerading attack – primary user emulation 
(PUE) attack – was first introduced in (Chen & Park, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2008c). This form of attack is extremely effective 
in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) environments. In a 
network that allows for DSA, the primary users own licenses 
to different frequency bands and can use those bands 
whenever they wish. However, when the primary users are 
idle, the secondary devices can opportunistically use the 
spectrum on those bands. Such secondary users need 
spectrum sensing algorithms to detect when the primary user 
is active. To attack a DSA algorithm, an attacker needs to 
create a waveform that is sufficiently similar to that of the 
primary user so that a false positive may be trigger in the 
spectrum sensing algorithm. With the false signal being 
emitted by the attacker, the secondary users in the 
communication range of a primary user will erroneously 
conclude that the primary user is active and will cause the 
system to vacate the channel. As a consequence, the 
adversary will gain unrivaled access to the specified 
frequency band.  However, this attack is transient in nature 
since it is a sensory manipulation attack (Clancy & Goergen, 
2008). Once the attacker vacates the frequency band, the 
secondary users can resume using the band.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. An Illustration of a masquerading attack on a 
primary user in a cognitive radio network 
 
Leon et al. have shown how a more sophisticated form of 
PUE attack can be launched when the attacker has some prior 
knowledge about the CR network (Leon et al., 2010). This 
attack can be launched in a CWSN as well. For example, if 
the attacker knows the exact time of occurrence of the “quite 
periods” of the CWSN, the attacker can launch the PUE 
attack during those time periods. A quite period in a CWSN 
is the interval of time during which all secondary users 
refrain from transmitting in order to enable a collaborative 
spectrum sensing environment. If any user receives a signal 
strength that is beyond a certain threshold it assumes that the 
signal is emitted by a primary user. Hence, if a malicious user 
transmits during the quite period, the other nodes wrongly 
assume it to be a primary user and a PUE attack is 
successfully launched. Another form of PUE attack can be 
launched by a malicious adversary whenever a CR network 
makes a frequent channel switchover. This type of PUE 
attack can degrade the throughput and may lead to a partial 
DoS attack.  
Other DSA algorithms are more stateful and gather more 
detailed statistics about the primary users. For example, some 
DSA algorithms gather channel access information of the 
primary users and accordingly makes prediction when the 
channel will be idle based on an estimation algorithm using 
the past and the current behavior of the primary user (Clancy 
& Walker, 2006). In such cases, spoofing primary user 
waveforms can affect the long-term behavior of a secondary 
user, turning this attack into a belief-manipulation attack 
(Clancy & Goergen, 2008).  
If an adversary attempts to prevent the secondary users 
from accessing the spectrum bands in a time-division multiple 
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access (TDMA) type primary user, the attacker needs to 
make the channel access pattern by the primary user look 
random during the learning phase of the secondary users’ 
cognitive engine. As a result, the secondary users are not able 
to accurately estimate the time when to transmit without 
interfering with the transmissions from other nodes. This 
failure in estimation leads to significant decrease in the 
overall capacity of the network since the spectrum usage is 
suboptimal. 
4.3   Unauthorized access of spectrum 
A malicious adversary node in a CWSN can launch an attack 
so that it can use spectrum bands for which it is not 
authorized or licensed and thereby gain more traffic capacity 
or bandwidth. Moreover, a malicious node can also emit 
power in unauthorized spectrum bands to cause DoS to the 
primary users.  
4.4   Physical attacks on the sensor nodes 
Physical attacks such as tampering with or damaging the 
hardware of even a very few sensor nodes in a CWSN can 
have a catastrophic effect on the overall operations of the 
network. Since the network operations in a CWSN is 
dependent on the correctness of the critical information 
exchanged among the nodes, the adverse impact due to node 
compromise is more severe in CWSNs than in traditional 
WSNs. In a traditional WSN, failure or compromise of a few 
sensor nodes usually have a minor impact on the network 
performance since the connectivity of the nodes are still 
maintained due to enough redundancy in the network. 
However, successful operation of a CWSN is dependent on 
the distributed information among the nodes and their 
cooperative behavior. Hence, even a single compromised or 
captured node in a CWSN can be a very powerful weapon in 
the hand of an attacker for causing disruption in network 
communication. A compromised node can easily allow 
extraction of cryptographic keys and modification in the 
internal code inside the node by an adversary leading to a 
catastrophic consequence. 
4.5   Internal failure of the sensor nodes 
Failure of CR nodes in a CWSN may occur due to various 
reasons, i.e., memory fault, physical failure or other hardware 
failure. The impact of these failures may be quite damaging 
on the overall network services. For example, a 
malfunctioning CR node may transmit signals in a wrong 
frequency band or may not properly participate in important 
spectrum management-related collaborative decision making. 
4.6   Power exhaustion attack on the sensor nodes 
The sensor nodes are battery powered and energy 
constrained. To deplete the energies in the sensor nodes, an 
attacker can launch various types of power exhaustion 
attacks. For example, the attacker can inflict sleep 
deprivation attack by engaging in it exchanging of 
unnecessary message communications to quickly drain off its 
energy. If the attacker intelligently selects the target nodes, 
the failure of the nodes can cause network partitioning 
leading to complete disruption of network operations. In 
another form of power exhaustion attack, the attacker node 
can request a channel change very frequently causing a high 
rate of power usage in the target nodes. 
4.7   Attacks on objective functions of cognitive engine 
In CWSNs, the cognitive engine in a sensor node has many 
radio parameters under its control. The cognitive engine 
determines the suitable values of these parameters over time 
in order to optimize its multi-goal objective functions 
(Clancy & Goergen, 2008). Various attacks are possible on 
the learning algorithms of the cognitive engines so that these 
algorithms produce suboptimal outputs. Since these attacks 
are targeted on the learning algorithms, they are also known 
as the belief- manipulation attacks. Clancy & Goergen have 
identified various input parameters of the cognitive engines 
such as: center frequency, bandwidth, transmit power, type of 
modulation, coding rate, channel access protocol, encryption 
algorithm, frame size etc (Clancy & Goergen, 2008). The 
cognitive radio may have three goals such as achieving low-
transmit power, high rate of transmission, and high security 
in communication. Based on the application currently under 
use, the cognitive engine assigns different weights to these 
three goals to maximize its overall objective function. In 
order to build a robust framework, in the learning phase, the 
radio tries out various combinations of different values of the 
input parameters, measures the observed statistics of the 
network such as bit error rate, and then evaluates the 
objective function for optimization. Among the three goals, 
low transmit power and high security in communication are 
directly controlled by the input. The other goal- high 
transmission rate is, however, defined by the system output. 
The adversary can affect the channel in such a way that high-
rate in communication is never achieved even when the 
correct values of the input parameters are chosen (Clancy & 
Goergen, 2008).
  
4.8   Attacks on the security policies of the sensor nodes 
The operating behavior of the sensor nodes in a CWSN are 
controlled by setting different policies in the nodes. These 
policies include security and privacy policies that determine 
access control, authentication, encryption/decryption, key 
revocation and other related operations. Several attacks may 
be launched by malicious attackers on these policies such as: 
(i) excuse attack (Araujo et al., 2012), (ii) newbie-picking 
attack (Araujo et al., 2012) etc. 
Excuse attack: if the network policy and the security 
policies in the nodes are very generous to allow faster 
recovery of nodes that might have crashed or damaged and if 
these policies do not require the nodes to prove their 
authenticity, a malicious node may exploit these policies by 
repeatedly claiming to have crashed/damaged. In this way, 
wrong spectrum information can be sent to the network very 
often to cause overload in the network leading to partial or 
complete disruption in network communications. 
Newbie-picking attack: if a CWSN requires that new nodes 
pay their dues by making it mandatory for them to give 
information to the network for some period of time before 
they can consume any shared resource, a veteran node could 
move from one newbie node to another, leeching their 
information without being required to give any information 
back.  
The operating policies in a CR node in a CWSN can be 
maliciously changed to alter the behavior of the node so that 
it can be used to support other attacks and threats such as 
causing harmful wireless interferences to primary or 
secondary user nodes which may lead to disruption in 
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network operations. 
4.9   Attacks on the cryptographic protocols  
These attacks attempt to break the security mechanisms in the 
network and the nodes by compromising the cryptographic 
protocols used. Although, this attack can be launched in 
various different ways, the ultimate objectives of different 
forms of attacks are the same: to break the cryptographic 
algorithm, extract the keys used in encryption, decryption 
and hash computation, and to identify any possible 
vulnerability in the software and hardware of the nodes. 
Since the nodes in a CWSN are inherently resource 
constrained, the cryptographic schemes implemented in these 
nodes are light-weight in nature. These light-weight schemes 
sometimes prove inadequate against powerful and 
sophisticated attacks launched by high-end automated tools 
used by the attackers. An attacker may also launch attacks on 
the key management scheme used in a CWSN by using 
different strategies such as: naïve brute force attack, 
sophisticated dictionary attack, and passive session 
monitoring attack to capture important session-related 
information. One example of a sophisticated attack is the 
differential power analysis (DPA) attack, in which an 
attacker measures the strengths of the electromagnetic signals 
emitted from a target node to successfully identify the key 
used for encryption and decryption of messages.   
4.10   Attacks on the privacy of sensor data 
Attacks on sensor data privacy are critical attacks since in 
many deployments of traditional WSNs and CWSNs, the 
sensor nodes collect and transmit sensitive data which need 
privacy protection. In CWSNs, the nodes share resources 
(i.e., spectrum) to establish communications among them and 
for developing a framework so that they are aware of the 
environmental parameters under which they are operate. If 
the privacy of such information is not protected, an adversary 
can successfully extract sensitive information from several 
nodes and may launch more powerful attacks on the network 
using the extracted information.  
The attacks on the privacy of the sensor nodes may involve 
different strategies such as: eavesdropping, impersonation, 
and traffic analysis. In passive eavesdropping attack, the 
attacker silently listens to the communications among the 
nodes to extract useful information about the session, and 
uses that information to launch a replay attack or an 
impersonation attack. In an impersonation attack, the 
attacker impersonates a legitimate node in the network and 
establishes communications with other nodes by providing its 
fake identity. In this way, the attacker can extract the secret 
cryptographic key used for encrypting the messages. In 
replay attack, the attacker reuses the captured sensitive 
information in an earlier session between two legitimate 
nodes and gains unauthorized access to network resources. 
An adversary node may monitor the messages to and from 
the legitimate nodes in a CWSN to launch a traffic analysis 
attack to deduce the context information of the nodes. The 
acquired information from traffic analysis is usually used 
later by the malicious adversary for devising more 
catastrophic attacks on the sensor nodes and the overall 
network. For example, spectrum information can be used by 
a malicious node to identify the weakest spectrum zone and 
to locate the zone from where the primary users emit their 
signals.  
Location privacy threats represent a unique challenge in 
CWSN deployment. This is mainly due to the fact that a 
secondary user’s spectrum sensing report on the signal 
propagation of the primary users are highly correlated to its 
physical location. Hence, similar to geo-locating individuals 
via WiFi or Bluetooth signals, a malicious attacker may 
exploit the correlation to geo-locate the secondary user and 
thus compromise the user’s location privacy. In (Gao et al., 
2012), the authors have identified the following location 
privacy attacks in CR networks which are relevant in CWSNs 
as well.  
External CR report and location correlation attack: Since 
the wireless communication is broadcast in nature, an 
external attacker may easily get an access to the CR reports 
of a specific sensing node by eavesdropping and compromise 
its location privacy by correlating the CR reports and the 
node’s physical location. 
Internal CR report and location correlation attack: A 
malicious attacker may participate in the collaborative 
sensing activities as a legitimate node and then may receive 
sensing reports from other nodes as rewards. After obtaining 
the sensing reports, it compromises any of these nodes’ 
location privacy by correlating the node’s CR reports and 
physical location. 
Internal differential CR report and location correlation 
attack: Unlike the two aforementioned attacks that are based 
on individual sensing reports, this attack analyzes the 
aggregation results of the sensing reports. The adversary 
appears as an internal node. It estimates a specific node’s 
sensing reports and infers its location information by 
comparing the aggregation result before and after the node 
joins/ leaves the network. 
The authors have named the first two types of attacks 
collectively as CR report and location correlation (RLC) 
attack and the third type of attack as the differential CR 
report and location correlation (DLC) attack. To launch the 
RLC or DLC attack, an attacker normally needs to generate 
the signal propagation patterns by collecting the average RSS 
value of each channel at every position. 
5. Work on Identification of CWSN Threats 
In this section, we present a detailed discussion on the some 
of the existing works in the literature identifying various 
types of specific attacks on CR networks and the ways in 
which these attacks are launched.  
5.1   Jamming attack 
Sampath et al. have discussed various ways in which 
jamming attacks can be launched on single channel and 
multi-channel 802.11 standard-compliant network using a 
single cognitive radio (Sampath et al., 2007). In the single 
channel jamming attack, the attacker continuously transmits 
high-power signals in the channel and causes interference 
with any communication form legitimate users in the 
network. In order to minimize energy consumption and 
detection of the attack more difficult, the attacker can also 
take a periodic jamming strategy in which the attacker 
transmits jamming packets at periodic intervals of time. In 
this strategy, the impact of jamming depends on the length of 
inter-jamming interval, the size of the jamming packets, and 
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the size of the data packets sent to the victim node. It has 
been found that the impact of jamming degrades gracefully 
with the increase in inter-jamming interval, while the use of 
large packet size at the victim node increases the impact of 
jamming. The authors have argued that there is an inherent 
trade-off between the network throughput and its attack 
resistance since the use of small packet size reduces the 
transmission efficiency while larger packets make the system 
more vulnerable to jamming attack. The single-channel 
jamming attack can be made ineffective if the users switch to 
different channels on observing high packet loss in a given 
channel. Alternatively, a random hopping across different 
channels may be done with periodic synchronization to set up 
the communication links.  In multi-channel jamming attacks, 
the authors have shown how an attacker can manipulate a 
cognitive radio to switch frequently across different channels 
and jam multiple channels simultaneously. Since, in addition 
to fast channel switching, the nodes in a CWSN have 
advanced channel sensing capabilities, the attacker can use a 
CR node to build up channel usage patterns of network users, 
and switch only among the channels which are currently 
under use. These types of highly intelligent and efficient 
attacks are very difficult to detect in CR networks (Xu et al., 
2005). In multi-channel jamming attacks, it has been shown 
that with the same energy consumption level, the effective 
number of channels which are successfully jammed increases 
with the total number of available channels in the system. 
The impact of jamming attacks under different radio settings 
is studied using the network simulator Qualnet. In the 
simulations, the authors have also examined the difference 
between the UDP and TCP traffic under jamming attack and 
the impact of the attack on packet size, and the channel 
switching delay.  
Burbank et al. have presented a detailed description on 
how various types of jamming attacks can be targeted in a 
CR network and how adverse these attacks can be on the 
overall network performance (Burbank et al., 2008). All 
these attacks are relevant in CWSNs as well. The authors 
have identified four goals of an attacker: (i) to launch an 
immediate DoS attack on CR nodes, (ii) to cause degradation 
in network performance, (iii) to extract important network 
information for launching more powerful attacks, and (iv) 
herding – to drive the victim CR network to a state from 
which a more powerful attack on the network can be 
launched. As an example, an attacker can launch jamming 
attack on a CR network to force the network to select an 
alternative frequency band for the cognitive control channel 
(CCC), wherein another malicious node can eavesdrop on the 
cognitive messages exchanged in that band.  
Sethi and Brown have presented a detailed discussion on 
various DoS attacks and a framework to analyze those attacks 
(Sethi & Brown, 2008). The framework, known as the 
“Hammer Model Framework”, graphically presents the 
potential risks sequences for DoS attacks, and investigates 
various types of vulnerabilities that may prevent CR 
communication in specific spectrum bands or completely 
deny a CR network to communicate or induce it to cause 
harmful interference to its existing legitimate users. In 
addition to jamming attacks, the authors have also considered 
attacks related to malicious alterations of cognitive messages 
and masquerading of a CR node by a malicious adversary. 
The authors have considered different architectures – 
collaborative, non-cooperative, centralized, and distributed – 
to identify, analyze and assess the risk levels posed by the 
attacks on these different CR design paradigms.  The 
analyses presented in the paper show that while the non-
cooperative CR design strategy is not a good idea since it is 
most vulnerable to attacks, the distributed and cooperative 
architecture is the most robust design and least susceptible to 
malicious attacks. 
Zhang et al. have classified various vulnerabilities on a CR 
network based on the CR functions and that adversely affects 
its learning ability and its ability to gainfully utilize the 
benefits of its dynamic spectrum access capability (Zhang et 
al., 2008). Arkoulis et al. have identified, analyzed and 
explained the security weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
cooperative, dynamic and open spectrum access 
environments that can be targeted by a malicious adversary to 
disrupt the network operations or degrade its performance 
(Arkoulis et al., 2008). The authors have followed an 
approach for identifying threats based on the types of 
anomalous behavior of the nodes such as: misbehavior, 
selfishness, cheating, and malicious intention. After 
identifying the threats, the authors have presented a detailed 
classification of the twenty two different attacks based on: (i) 
the attack type, (ii) the type of protocols (distributed or 
centralized) the attacks target, and (iii) the architecture that 
these attacks apply for their operations.  
Burbank presents some major vulnerabilities in CR 
networks in general and identifies various challenges in 
defending against these threats (Burbank, 2008). In order to 
identify specific security challenges in CR networks which 
are applicable for CWSNs as well, the author has first 
pointed out two fundamental differences between a 
traditional wireless network and a CR network. In the CR 
networks the attacker has: (i) the potential far reach and long-
lasting nature of an attack, and (ii) the ability to have a 
profound effect on network performance and behavior 
through simple spectral manipulation by generating false 
signals. In a CR network, the nodes exchange locally-
collected information to construct a perceived environment 
that that determines the current and future behavior of the 
nodes. The author argues that in a CR network, a malicious 
adversary can propagate its behavior through the network in 
the same way a malicious worm propagates in a network. The 
adversary can carry out spectral manipulation for influencing 
the behavior of a set of local CRs or a distant CR as well. 
The author has also identified various features of CR 
networks and the implications of these features on potential 
attacks on these networks. For defending against these 
attacks, four essential abilities of CR network have been 
identified: (i) the ability to provide strong authentication to 
the local observations that are used to form the perceived 
environment, (ii) the ability to provide a robust and secure 
framework for exchanging messages among the CR elements, 
(iii) the ability to authenticate and provide integrity 
protection to the information exchanged between the CR 
elements, and (iv) the ability to perform self-analysis of the 
network behavior.  
Brown and Sethi present a multidimensional analysis and 
assessment of various DoS attacks on all types of CR 
networks (Brown & Sethi, 2008). The authors have carried 
out vulnerability analysis of CR network against various DoS 
attacks using different parameters such as network 
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architecture employed, the spectrum access technique used, 
and the spectrum awareness model. Three classes of network 
architecture are considered- (i) non-cooperative, (ii) 
cooperative and centralized, and (iii) cooperative and 
distributed. For spectrum access methods used, the CR 
networks and hence the CWSNs are assumed to operate 
either in an overlay or an underlay network. In an overlay 
network, CR searches for white space bands for 
communication purpose. In the underlay network, the CR 
uses spread spectrum or ultra-wideband techniques along 
with transmit power control to minimize interference.  
The CR is also assumed to be aware of usage and 
availability of spectrum in its vicinity using three approaches: 
(i) geo-location/database approach, (ii) beacon/control signal 
approach, and (iii) detection/sensing approach. For analyzing 
various DoS attacks, the authors have categorized these 
attacks into two types – denial attacks and induce attacks. 
While the denial attacks are intended to prevent 
communications in the network, the induce class of 
vulnerabilities stimulate the CR node to communicate 
causing interference with a licensed transmitter.  
The adverse impact of the above-mentioned attacks is not 
reflected immediately. However, these attacks cause 
permission policies to be tightened or eliminated potentially 
denying network services over a long-term. The authors have 
shown that the induce attacks may be manifested in five 
different forms such as: (i) the licensed spectrum appears 
unoccupied, (ii) the policy is incorrect, (iii) the location 
information is incorrect, (iv) the sensor provides incorrect 
measurements, and (v) the commands to the Tx/Rx are 
incorrect. For each category of attack, the authors have 
presented detailed discussions on its relative effectiveness 
and its possible protection measures. In multi-dimensional 
analysis of DoS attacks, the authors have enumerated a 
number of metrics for assessing the attack effectiveness such 
as: jamming gain (Brown et al., 2006), jamming efficiency 
(Brown et al., 2006), packet send ratio (Xu et al., 2005), and 
packet delivery ratio (Xu et al., 2005). However, no 
analytical framework is provided for computing the attack 
effectiveness.    
5.2   Primary user emulation (PUE) attack 
Chen et al. have identified a threat to spectrum sensing, 
named the primary user emulation (PUE) attack in which an 
adversary’s CR transmits signals whose characteristics 
emulate those of incumbent signals (Chen et al., 2008c). This 
attack is particularly easy to launch in a CR networks 
especially in CWSN due to the highly flexible and software-
based air interfaces of CR sensor nodes. The study carried 
out by the authors have shown that such an attack can be 
catastrophic since it severely interferes with the spectrum 
sensing process and reduces the channel resources available 
to the legitimate unlicensed users in the network. The authors 
have classified the PUE attacks into two categories: selfish 
attacks and malicious attacks. In a selfish PUE attack, the 
attacker’s objective is to maximize its own spectrum usage. 
When a selfish PUE attacker detects an unused spectrum 
band, it transmits a signal that emulates the characteristics of 
the signals of the primary users thereby preventing other 
secondary users from competing for the vacant spectrum 
band. This type of selfish attack is launched by a pair of 
secondary users whose intention is to establish a dedicated 
link between them. The objective of a malicious PUE attack, 
however, is to thwart the DSA process of the legitimate 
secondary users and to prevent them from detecting and 
using fallow licensed spectrum bands. The final goal of the 
attacker is to carry out a DoS attack on the DSA process in a 
single or multiple bands. To counter this attack, the authors 
have proposed a transmitter verification scheme called 
LocDof (localization-based defense) that verifies whether 
given signal is really that from an incumbent transmitter by 
estimating its location and observing its signal 
characteristics. For estimating the location of the signal 
transmitter, the verification scheme employs a non-interactive 
localization mechanism that utilizes the services of a wireless 
sensor network to collect snapshots of received signal 
strength (RSS) measurements across the CR networks. By 
averaging out the RSS measurements and identifying the RSS 
peaks, the transmitter location is estimated. The authors have 
also presented a detailed security analysis of the proposed 
localization scheme and evaluated its performance using 
simulations.  
In another work, Chen et al. have discussed two different 
security threats on CR network which are known as 
incumbent emulation (IE) attack and spectrum sensing data 
falsification (SSDF) attack (Chen et al, 2008b). The IE attack 
is essentially same as the PUE attack since the primary users 
are also sometimes referred to as the incumbents. The authors 
have presented two mechanisms to defend against the IE 
attack. The first mechanism, known as the distance ratio test 
(DRT) uses RSS measurements obtained from a pair of 
location verifiers (LV) to verify the location of the 
transmitter (Chen & Park, 2006). Since there is a strong 
correlation between the length of a wireless link and the RSS, 
the RSS value at two LVs correlate with their respective 
distances to the location of the transmitter. The second 
technique proposed by the authors for defending against the 
IE attack is known as the distance difference test (DDT) 
(Chen & Park, 2006). This technique relies on the fact that 
when a signal is transmitted form a single source to two LVs, 
a relative phase difference is observed when the signal 
reaches the LVs due to the differential distances from the 
transmitter. This phase difference can be translated into a 
time difference which in turn can be converted into a distance 
difference. This expected difference is compared with the 
measured difference to determine the authenticity of the 
incumbent signal.  If the two values are found to be 
sufficiently close, the transmitter is considered to be a 
legitimate incumbent. The other security threat identified by 
the authors, i.e., the SSDF attack is carried out by malicious 
secondary nodes that transmit false spectrum sensing data to 
other nodes in the CR network. This attack is particularly 
critical in a CWSN, since sending of false spectrum sensing 
information to a data collector in the network can cause the 
data collector to make a wrong spectrum sensing decision 
resulting in a catastrophic impact on the network 
performance. The authors have argued that to maintain an 
acceptable level of accuracy in the event of an SSDF attack, 
the data fusion technique used in the distributed spectrum 
sensing (DSS) needs to be robust against fraudulent local 
spectrum sensing results reported   by malicious secondary 
nodes. To effectively defend against SSDF attack, the authors 
have proposed a two-level defense technique. At the first 
level, an authentication mechanism should be in place for 
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verifying the authenticity of all local spectrum sensing results 
sent to the data collector, so that any possible replay attack or 
false data injection attempted by any external entity can be 
prevented. In the second level, a data fusion scheme should 
be deployed that is robust against SDDF attack. In order to 
achieve this, sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)-based 
data fusion technique may be used that supports a variable 
number of local spectrum sensing results. The robustness of 
the data fusion technique can also be enhanced by using a 
reputation-based scheme into the DSS process.  
Wang et al. have argued that one of the major challenges 
in CR networks is to detect the presence of primary users’ 
transmission, since malicious secondary users can send false 
spectrum sensing information and mislead the spectrum 
sensing data fusion process to cause collision, interference 
and inefficient spectrum usage (Wang et al., 2009c). For 
example, the secondary users can always falsely report the 
existence of a primary user so that they can occupy the 
spectrum for a long time. To detect and defend against such 
security vulnerability, the authors have proposed a malicious 
user detection algorithm that computes the suspicious level of 
secondary users and utilizes the suspicious level to eliminate 
the malicious users’ influence on the primary user detection 
results. The receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves 
for the primary user detection algorithm used in simulation 
have demonstrated that proposed security scheme is highly 
effective in a collaborative spectrum sensing environment. 
Clancy and Khawar have highlighted the need of robust 
signal classification mechanisms for CR networks so that 
different types of transmitters can be differentiated in a 
particular frequency band in order to defend against the PUE 
attacks (Clancy & Khawar, 2009). In a DSA environment, 
signal classification techniques typically combine signal 
processing and pattern matching for enabling the secondary 
users to reliably authenticate signal of a primary user. The 
signal classification can be achieved by extracting the salient 
features of the signal using numerous signal processing 
techniques and then matching these features to a pattern of a 
known primary user. These features can range from the 
spectral shape of the primary users signals to high order 
cyclostationary features of the signal (Cabric et al., 2004). In 
their proposition, the authors have followed the approach of 
using unsupervised learning in feature-based signal 
classification in a DSA environment since unsupervised 
learning requires minimal pre-configuration in building 
cognitive radio systems. The signal classification is done 
using self-organizing maps and then the authors have 
presented scenarios in which the output classes of the neural 
network are manipulated by an attacker so that the attacker 
signals are misclassified by the system as those of the 
primary users. The authors have also proposed mechanisms 
to defend against such types of attacks on a CR network. 
However, the proposed mechanism for attack identification 
requires sophisticated signal classification algorithms which 
will pose significant challenges in their implementation in 
CWSNs.  
Anand et al. have presented a novel analytical framework 
to analyze the feasibility of PUE attack in a CR network 
which can be applied to a CWSN as well (Anand et al., 
2008). The authors derived mathematical expressions for 
computing the probability of a successful PUE attack and 
have also provided the lower bounds on the probability of a 
successful attack on a secondary user by a set of co-operating 
malicious users using Fenton’s approximation (Fenton, 
1960) and Markov inequality (Ross, 2009). For developing 
their proposed model, the authors have considered a fading 
wireless environment with losses due to attenuation, fading 
and shadowing and have analyzed various parameters that 
can affect the feasibility of a PUE attack. The analysis shows 
that the probability of a successful PUE attack increases with 
the distance between the primary transmitter and the 
secondary users. 
5.3   Masquerading attack 
Masquerading attack on a CR node and the attack involving 
malicious alteration of CR nodes for disrupting spectrum 
sensing functions have attracted considerable research 
attention.  
Wang et al. have studied the adverse effect of malicious 
and compromised secondary users in a CR network (Wang et 
al., 2009b). The compromised secondary users can report 
false spectrum detection results in a collaborative spectrum 
sensing in a CR network and significantly degrade the 
network performance. The authors have considered a 
scenario in which there are multiple number of malicious 
secondary users in a CR network and have proposed an 
“onion-peeling approach” to defend against these multiple 
untrustworthy secondary users. The proposed approach is 
based on computation of the suspicion level of each 
secondary node based on its spectrum sensing report. If the 
suspicion level of a node exceeds a predefined threshold 
value, the node is considered to be malicious and its report is 
excluded in the collaborative spectrum sensing decisions. In 
summary, the proposed mechanism has two distinct 
advantages: (i) it is self-adaptive and hence does not need to 
know the number of malicious nodes in the network 
beforehand, and (ii) it has a better performance compared the 
similar security schemes that work based on the a priori 
knowledge of the maximum number of compromised nodes 
in the network. The simulation results have shown that while 
the presence of malicious secondary node adversely affects 
the performance of the CR network, the proposed security 
scheme greatly improves the network performance by 
efficiently detecting the malicious and compromised nodes. 
In a similar work, Wang et al. have investigated ways to 
improve the security in collaborative sensing so that 
malicious secondary users cannot send false spectrum 
sensing reports to attack the spectrum-related data fusion 
process (Wang et al., 2009c). The proposed malicious user 
detection scheme is based on computation of trust values as 
well as the consistency values that are subsequently used to 
detect malicious behavior so that the nodes exhibiting 
malicious behavior are not allowed to influence the primary 
user detection results. In this way, malicious secondary users 
are prevented from masquerading the primary users’ signals.  
Chen et al. have considered the security issues related to 
malicious secondary users reporting false spectrum sensing 
information due to Byzantine failure in a distributed 
spectrum sensing environment in a CR network (Chen et al., 
2008a). The Byzantine failures, such as device malfunction 
or attacks severely affects the spectrum sensing in a CR 
network since these failures or attacks can enable an attacker 
to constantly report the spectrum in a band being in use 
causing severe under-utilization, or it might cause missed 
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detection of primary users resulting in interference with its 
communication. To increase the resilience and robustness of 
CR networks under such attacks, the authors have proposed a 
scheme called weighted sequential probability ratio test 
(WSPRT). The analysis and simulation results reported by 
the authors show that the proposed scheme can guarantee the 
accuracy of sensing results even when a considerable number 
of secondary users report false  sensing information. Hu et al. 
have also addressed the issue of Byzantine failures of 
secondary users in a CR network, and have proposed a 
security mechanism that is similar WSPRT (Hu et al., 2009). 
In this scheme, the binary local reports used in WSPRT are 
replaced with N-bit local reports to achieve an enhanced 
detection performance. The proposed scheme also uses three 
types of reputation rating evaluation schemes: neutral, 
punitive and heavy punitive. The simulation results have 
shown that the heavy punitive scheme is the most robust 
against Byzantine or malicious sensing terminals.  
Mody et al. have discussed various security threats in 
IEEE 802.22 standard-compliant devices which are deployed 
in CR networks (Mody et al., 2009). The authors have also 
presented a framework for attack classification for CR 
networks that includes attacks such as: jamming, malicious 
alteration of cognitive messages, masquerading of primary 
users, malicious alteration of CR nodes, and masquerading of 
CR nodes. This attack classification framework is applicable 
for CWSNs as well. 
5.4   False spectrum reports sent by secondary users 
The threats due to false spectrum reports sent by malicious 
secondary users have also received attention from the 
research community. Two notable works in this area can be 
found in (Safdar & O’Neill, 2009; Li & Han, 2010).  
Safdar and O’Neill have identified the need of securing the 
cognitive control channels to perform channel negotiations 
before any actual data transmission among the nodes in a CR 
network (Safdar & O’Neill, 2009). Securing the control 
channels ensures that CR messages communicated over these 
channels cannot be altered by a malicious adversary. This 
protection is critical in CWSNs which are deployed for 
mission-critical applications. The authors have proposed a 
novel framework for providing common control channel 
security for co-operatively communicating CR nodes so that 
a pair of CR nodes can authenticate each other prior to any 
confidential channel negotiations to ensure subsequent 
security against attacks. The proposed detection approach is 
based on identifying the malicious secondary nodes that 
possibly send false reports in collaborative sensing networks.  
Li and Han have discussed a critical security issue in 
collaborative spectrum sensing, in which malicious 
secondary user(s) sends false spectrum report to thwart the 
spectrum data fusion process (Li & Han, 2010). The authors 
observe that while it is mandatory to detect potential 
attackers and make attack-proof decisions for spectrum 
sensing, most of the existing attacker detection schemes 
assume a priori knowledge of the attacker’s strategy and thus 
apply the Bayesian detection of attackers. However, in real-
world CR networks, the data centers do not have any prior 
information about the strategy adopted by the attackers. To 
overcome this shortcoming of the existing detection 
algorithms, the authors have proposed an abnormality 
detection approach that is based on counterpart technique in 
data mining. The performance of the attacker detection 
scheme in presence of a single attacker in the network is 
analyzed explicitly. The single-attacker scenario is 
considered in two different cases. In the first case, known as 
the independent attack, the attacker does not know the 
reports of the honest secondary users. In this case, it is 
numerically shown that the attacker can certainly be detected 
as the number of spectrum sensing rounds tends to be very 
large. In the second case, known as the dependent attack, the 
attacker knows the reports of all the secondary users, and 
sends its report based on the information in the reports of the 
other secondary users. In this case, the authors have shown 
that the attacker can successfully avoid being detected if 
he/she has perfect information about the missed detection and 
false alarm probabilities of the detection system. Finally, the 
performance of the detection scheme in presence of multiple 
attackers is analyzed using numerical simulations.  
5.5 Attacks on cognitive control channels 
Prasad has argued that design of CR network poses many 
new technical challenges in protocol design, power 
efficiency, spectrum management, spectrum detection, 
environment awareness, novel distributed algorithms design 
for decision making, distributed spectrum measurements, 
quality of service (QoS) guarantees, and security (Prasad, 
2008). Overcoming these issues becomes even more 
challenging due to non-uniform spectrum and other radio 
resource allocation policies, economic considerations, the 
inherent transmission impairments of wireless links, and user 
mobility. In presence of these challenges, ensuring security 
and robustness in network operations becomes extremely 
critical. The author have identified various research 
challenges for security in CR networks and have presented 
the security and privacy requirements, threat analysis and an 
integrated framework for security using fast authentication 
and authorization architecture.  
5.6 Attacks on the MAC layer 
Zhu and Zhou have provided a security analysis of the MAC 
protocols used in CR networks by investigating the impact of 
DoS attacks on these protocols (Zhu & Zhou, 2008). The 
authors have argued that all MAC protocols for a multi-hop 
CR networks use a common control channel to perform 
channel negotiation before data transmission. Insecure 
transmissions of control channels provide opportunities to 
malicious adversaries for launching DoS attacks. In order to 
make a security analysis of the MAC protocols, the authors 
have distinguished two types of attacks and then discussed 
how DoS attacks can be successfully launched on the MAC 
protocols. The authors have also presented a detailed 
discussion on MAC layer greedy behaviors in CR networks 
and the factors that determines the efficiency of the DoS 
attacks.   
5.7 Attacks on the cognitive engines 
Clancy and Goergen have defined three classes of attacks on 
the cognitive engine of CR networks (Clancy & Goergen, 
2008). All these types of attacks manipulate the behaviour of 
the CR system such that the radio acts either sub-optimally or 
even sometimes maliciously. Three classes of attacks that are 
identified by the authors are: (i) sensory manipulation attacks 
against policy radios, (ii) belief manipulation attacks against 
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the learning radios, and (iii) self-propagating behaviour 
leading to cognitive radio viruses. In a policy radio, the main 
vulnerability lies in the fact that an attacker can spoof faulty 
sensor information that can cause the radio to select a sub-
optimal configuration. Since the radio sensors take digitized 
RF and extract useful statistics from it, by manipulating the 
RF that is available to the radio, an attacker can cause faulty 
statistics to appear in the CR knowledge base. The learning 
radios are also vulnerable to the same threats as the policy 
radios. However, since a leaning radio uses all its past 
experiences in building its long-term behavior, attacks on it 
are much more detrimental. For example, an attacker can 
transmit a jamming signal whenever a policy radio attempts 
to switch to a faster modulation rate. This will always force 
the CR to operate at a lower modulation rate, resulting in 
lower links speeds and link degradation. The authors have 
called these attacks as belief manipulation attack since these 
attacks can potentially have much longer-term adverse 
impact of the learning radios. The self-propagating behaviour 
of the radio can be utilized by a malicious attacker to launch 
the most powerful type of attack. In such an attack, the state 
on radio causes a behaviour that can induce the same state on 
another radio. Once the target radio attains the state, it 
exhibits behaviour that leads to a state change in another 
radio so that it attains the same state. Eventually, the same 
state propagates through all radios in a particular area in the 
CR network. The resultant effect is that of a cognitive radio 
virus that propagates through the network. When acting 
optimally, all device traverse through the same states and 
execute the same behavior. However, an attacker can 
influence this equilibrium in such a way that asymptotic state 
attained by all the nodes are not optimal (possibly far from 
optimal) and even malicious.  
5.8 Threats related to the hidden node problem 
The threats related to the hidden node problem in CR 
networks have also been studied extensively by the 
researchers. The notable works in this domain are (Biswas et 
al., 2009; Nuallain, 2008; Bliss, 2010). Biswas et al. have 
proposed a technique to handle both wideband and 
cooperative spectrum sensing tasks in a distributed spectrum 
sensing environment (Biswas et al., 2009). In the proposed 
approach, the wideband spectrum is divided into several sub-
bands and a group of CR nodes is assigned for sensing of a 
particular narrow sub-band. A cognitive base station is sued 
for collecting the spectrum sensing results and for making the 
final decision over the full spectrum. The simulation results 
have shown that the proposed approach minimizes time and 
energy spent for wideband spectrum scanning by a CR node, 
and it also effectively detects the primary users in the 
wideband spectrum. Nuallain have presented a fast and 
robust propagation method for addressing the hidden node 
problem in a CR network (Nuallain, 2008). The proposed 
method in conjunction with a radio environment mapping 
server can be used to address the hidden node problem and 
also to ensure security and reliability in CR networks. The 
authors have also provided a roadmap for the development of 
the propagation method so that sufficient accuracy in the 
results can be achieved. Bliss have investigated the optimal 
spectral efficiency for a given message size that minimizes 
the probability of causing disruptive interference for a CR 
network (Bliss, 2010). The ultimate goal of the work is to 
have an optimization between longer transmit duration and 
wider bandwidth versus higher transmit power so as to tackle 
the hidden node problem in wireless network communication. 
The probability of interference is assumed to be 
characterized by the probability that the signal power 
received by a hidden node in a wireless network exceeds 
some pre-defined threshold value.  
6. Security Mechanisms for CWSNs 
In this section, we first identify the main security 
requirements in a CWSN and then discuss various security 
schemes for defending against attacks in these networks. In a 
CWSN, the sensor nodes participate in collaborative 
spectrum sensing activities. The main security requirements 
in these networks are as follows (Gao et al, 2012): 
Authentication mechanisms: A robust authentication 
mechanism is a prime requirement in collaborative spectrum 
sensing for ensuring that only the legitimate nodes in the 
network can only access the spectrum. The authentication 
scheme may have different perspectives to different 
categories of nodes in a CWSN. The authentication of the 
primary users is a critical issue since in an attacker may 
transmit signals with high power that has close resemblance 
with the signals of a primary user, thereby launching a 
primary user emulation (PUE) attack (Chen et al., 2008c; Liu 
et al., 2010). To prevent such an attack, the secondary users 
should have a robust verification scheme for verifying the 
authenticity of the received signals when they sense the 
channel. Similarly, when the secondary users receive the 
sensing reports from other users, they should be able to verify 
the authenticity of the other secondary users. Otherwise, a 
potential adversary may be able to spoof the identity of a 
secondary user for sending false sensing reports. The 
authentication of sensing reports distributed across the 
network is also a very important issue. Even if the identities 
of the secondary user and their authentication are done 
during the sensing reports aggregation process, it is still 
possible for a malicious secondary user to send false sensing 
reports. This attack is known as spectrum sensing data 
falsification (SSDF) attack (Wang et al., 2009b; Fatemieh et 
al., 2011). It is, therefore, mandatory that each sensing report 
used in the aggregation process is authenticated as well.  
Incentive mechanisms: Most of the collaborative sensing 
schemes are based on a simple assumption that all the 
secondary nodes voluntarily participate in spectrum sensing. 
However, this assumption may not hold good for selfish 
secondary users who may not cooperate in order to conserve 
their own resources like energy and memory (Song & Zhang, 
2009; Wang et al., 2010). Such selfish behavior may 
seriously degrade the performance of a CWSN. Incentive 
schemes are necessary for minimizing the probability of such 
selfish behavior. 
Data and message confidentiality: The sensing reports 
need to be well protected so that these messages are not 
misused by unauthorized external users who may monitor the 
communication channels by eavesdropping in order to gain 
useful information. Data and message confidentiality can be 
achieved by using end-to-end robust encryption algorithms 
which in turn needs mutual authentication and authorization 
among the collaborating nodes participating in spectrum 
sensing. 
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Privacy preservation of sensor data: Privacy protection 
is primarily for preserving the anonymity of the sensing 
nodes and/or privacy of its location. Location privacy 
protection attempts to prevent a possible adversary form 
linking a sensing node’s sensing report to the physical 
location of the sensing node.  
In order to satisfy the aforementioned security 
requirements and to defend against various possible attacks 
on the sensor nodes in a CWSN, various defense mechanisms 
have been proposed by the researchers. In the rest of this 
section, we present a brief discussion on some of these 
propositions. Some specific security mechanisms for CWSNs 
are discussed in detail in Section 6. 
The masquerading attacks and the attacks involving 
distribution of false information in cooperative CR networks 
for CR-related functions (i.e., spectrum sensing, spectrum 
management, spectrum sharing, and spectrum mobility) have 
attracted significant attention of the research community 
since these attacks are considered to have most adverse 
impact on the network operations. In majority of the existing 
security schemes, the secondary users are usually assumed to 
be trustworthy. However, such schemes will be broken in the 
event of any masquerading attack launched by a malicious 
secondary user. A significant number of schemes have been 
proposed by the researchers for addressing the vulnerabilities 
and improving the robustness of the collaborative sensing 
algorithms used in the CR networks in general, and CWSNs 
in particular.  
The security mechanisms for CWNs can be broadly 
divided into the following categories: (i) security 
mechanisms for enhancing the robustness in sensor inputs, 
(ii) security mechanisms based on the reputation and trust of 
the nodes, (iii) defense schemes based on identification of 
masquerading attack by signal analysis, (iv) robust 
authentication schemes using appropriate cryptographic 
algorithms, (v) security mechanisms for preventing 
unauthorized access to the spectrum, (vi) security 
mechanisms for defending against attacks on the MAC layer 
and the cognitive engine of the network, (vii) protection 
mechanisms for increasing the robustness of the cognitive 
control channel against jamming and saturation attacks, and 
(viii) security mechanisms deployed using geo-location 
database of the primary users in the network.  
In the following, we present a brief discussion on these 
various types of security mechanisms deployed in CR 
networks. 
6.1 Enhancing robustness in sensor inputs 
If the reliability of sensor inputs is enhanced, many of the 
attacks on CR networks can be effectively defended. For 
example, if the cognitive radios can minutely identify the 
differences between interference and noise, they can 
distinguish and hence identify natural and artificial RF 
events. Such sensors can feed specialized policy engine 
algorithms that specifically look for hostile signals that may 
be try to subvert a radio’s belief. In a distributed computing 
scenario, a group of cognitive nodes can fuse sensor data to 
improve the performance of the overall network. For 
example, if multiple sensor nodes exchange time-
synchronized RF information, they can cross-correlate the 
exchanged information to arrive at a more precise 
identification of an attacker in the network. The task becomes 
challenging, however, since the all sensory inputs are 
imprecise to a certain extent. Therefore, for each input, the 
designers should ideally quantify the probability of detection 
failure in both benign and hostile environments. Since, in 
certain scenarios, the attackers have power limitations, the 
designers may get an opportunity to compute the theoretical 
upper bound of the attack effectiveness and make appropriate 
risk mitigation. 
6.2 Reputation- and trust-based security systems  
A significant number of schemes are proposed by the 
researchers using reputation and trust of the nodes in a CR 
network for defending against attacks such as malicious 
alteration of cognitive messages, masquerading of the 
primary users, malicious alteration of cognitive radio nodes, 
and masquerading of cognitive radio nodes. Using the 
concepts of reputation and trust, a node can be mapped to a 
particular level of trustworthiness. On the basis of the 
information that the node has shared with other nodes 
regarding its spectrum sensing information, the trust and 
reputation metrics are computed for a node (Sen, 2010c; Sen, 
2013). If the information shared by the node is found to be 
incorrect after a certain number of iterations by its neighbors, 
the node is considered to be malicious and appropriate 
security policies are applied to deal with the identified 
malicious node.  
Zeng et al. have proposed a reputation-based cooperative 
spectrum sensing (CSS) framework using trusted nodes in a 
CR network (Zeng et al., 2010). The authors categorize the 
reputation of each node into one of the three categories: (i) 
discarded, (ii) pending, and (iii) reliable. At first, sensing 
information from the trusted nodes only is considered reliable 
and used in the decision making. Reputations of other nodes 
are put in the pending state, and they are accumulated 
through a consistency check by the global and local sensing 
decisions. The information received from the nodes which 
have their trust values greater than a pre-defined threshold is 
then considered reliable and their sensing results are 
incorporated in the CSS. The use of reputation system 
increases the robustness of the proposed cooperative sensing 
scheme.  
Duan et al. have proposed a reputation-based secure 
cooperative spectrum sensing algorithm in a CR network 
(Duan et al., 2009). The proposed algorithm uses a double 
threshold detector and is effective in mitigating the adverse 
effects of shadowing and fading in wireless channels in 
cooperative spectrum sensing and in eliminating the problem 
related to fail sensing in CR networks. The authors have 
analytically derived the closed forms for the normalized 
average number of sensing bits, the probabilities of the 
detection and false-alarm rates. The simulation results show 
that the average number of sensing bits in the proposed 
algorithm decreases to a large extent without fail sensing 
problem and the sensing performance is improved as 
compared with the conventional double threshold detection 
and the conventional single threshold detection. 
Several work have been done for detecting malicious 
nodes using trust-based decision framework in CR networks 
(Wang et al., 2009b; Wang et al., 2009c; Kaligineedi et al., 
2008). While in (Wang et al., 2008b), the attack is 
considered to be launched by a single malicious node, the 
authors in (Wang et al., 2009c; Kaligineedi et al., 2008) have 
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presented scenarios in which multiple malicious node launch 
a cooperative attack in a distributed manner. All these 
detection schemes, however, use a centralized spectrum 
sensing architecture. The serious drawback of the approach 
is that the complexity of the detection algorithm becomes 
prohibitively high in the event of a large number of malicious 
nodes launching a cooperative and distributed attack. To 
simplify the problem, the authors have presented an onion-
peeling mechanism where all the nodes in the CR network 
are initially considered malicious (till they are proved to be 
honest) when a specific threshold of abnormality in their 
behavior is crossed.  
Li and Han propose an anomaly detection algorithm for 
identifying attackers in a collaborative spectrum sensing 
environment (Li & Han, 2010). The proposed scheme does 
not assume any a priori information about the strategy used 
by the attackers in launching the attack. Hence, it is robust 
against most of the spectrum misuse attacks.   
Kaligineedi et al. describe an attack detection scheme to 
identify malicious users that prevents spreading of false 
spectrum sensing information in a CR network (Kaligineedi 
et al., 2008). The scheme uses the average power obtained 
from the real-valued reports received from cognitive nodes 
for making a global decision on spectrum sensing. The attack 
detection is done using a trust factor mechanism. The authors 
have considered different kind of malicious behaviors of the 
nodes such as: (i) always yes nodes, (ii) always no nodes, 
(iii) nodes producing false sensing reports once in a while. 
An “always yes node” reports a value above the threshold 
(i.e., it declares that a primary user is present) all the time. 
On the other hand, an “always no node” reports a value 
below the threshold thereby always declaring the absence of 
primary user in its vicinity. While the “always yes nodes” 
increase the probability of false alarm, the “always no nodes” 
decrease the probability of detection. The nodes that produce 
false values once in a while significantly affect the 
performance of the sensing system during those intervals of 
sensing in which they send false information. The proposed 
scheme can identify each of the three categories of malicious 
behaviors if the energy values of the malicious nodes differ in 
distribution from the underlying distribution of the energy 
values of the legitimate nodes. The malicious nodes are 
detected using an outlier detection method that assigns a trust 
factor to each user based on the reliability of the past and the 
present spectrum sensing reports sent by the user.  
Chen et al. present a security scheme based on weighted 
sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) to deal with the 
Byzantine failures on nodes in the data fusion process of 
collaborative spectrum sensing in a CR network (Chen et al., 
2008a). In this scheme, each node is allocated a reputation 
rating based on the consistency of the local sensing report of 
the node with the final decision in the spectrum sensing.  
Peng et al. discuss the motivations for cross-layer design in 
CR networks and its various security aspects (Peng et al., 
2009). The authors also propose a novel architecture in 
which dynamic channel access is achieved by a cross-layer 
design between the PHY and the MAC layers in a cognitive 
node. It has also been shown that among various alternatives, 
the centralized cooperative security architecture is more 
efficient and effective for defending against Byzantine failure 
of nodes. 
Anand et al. have analyzed the performance limitations of 
collaborative spectrum sensing in a DSS environment under 
Byzantine attacks where malicious users send false spectrum 
sensing data to the fusion center leading to increased 
probability of incorrect sensing results and wrong global 
decisions being taken by the CR (Anand et al., 2010). The 
authors show that if the percentage of Byzantine attackers in 
a cognitive network exceeds a certain threshold value, the 
data fusion scheme utilized for spectrum data fusion becomes 
highly unreliable. Under such situations, no reputation-based 
fusion system can achieve any performance gain in the data 
fusion operation. Further, the authors also present an optimal 
set of attack strategies for a given set of attack resources and 
propose possible counter measures at the data fusion center.  
Xu et al. present a collaborative sensing algorithm that 
uses an energy detector with double thresholds and an 
extended data fusion rules to identify untrusted and possibly 
malicious CR nodes (Xu et al., 2009). The authors propose 
the use of an energy detector with two thresholds in a 
censoring sensor to reduce the transmitted bits in a 
bandwidth-limited channel. In the censoring sensor, the users 
whose received energy is above or below the two pre-defined 
thresholds make local decisions and send one-bit results to 
the fusion center. The users, whose energy lies in between the 
pair of threshold values, send no information. The authors 
also compute the probabilities of detection and false alarms 
of three different data fusion rules proposed in the scheme. 
The simulation results have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the proposed scheme in defending against untrusted 
secondary users.  
Yu et al. discuss the security issues related to the spectrum 
sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks on cognitive radio- 
mobile ad hoc networks (CR-MANETs) in which attacker(s) 
sends false local spectrum sensing results in a DSS 
environment (Yu et al., 2009). The authors propose a 
consensus-based cooperative spectrum sensing scheme for 
defending against the SSDF attack in CR-MANETs. The 
proposed scheme is inspired from the self-organizing 
behavior of animal groups. Unlike most of the schemes for 
defending SSDF attack, the proposed mechanism does not 
need a common receiver to carry out data fusion for global 
decision on spectrum sensing.   
6.3 Masquerading attack detection by signal analysis 
Signal analysis is a popular and widely used technique for 
identifying malicious attacker(s) in CR networks since this 
method is very effective in detecting an attacker that 
masquerades as an incumbent transmitter by transmitting 
unrecognized signals in one of the licensed bands. Since by 
transmitting unrecognized signals in the licensed bands the 
attacker can effectively prevent secondary users in the CR 
network from accessing the same spectrum band, detection of 
such attacks is critical. Spectrum sensing can be done in a 
variety of ways. Some of the commonly used spectrum 
sensing methods are: sensing based on energy detection (also 
known as radiometry or periodogram), waveform-based 
sensing, cyclostationarity-based sensing, radio identification-
based sensing, matched filtering, multi-taper spectral 
estimation, wavelet transform-based estimation, Hough 
transform, and time-frequency analysis (Yucek & Arslan, 
2009). However, each of these spectrum sensing techniques 
are vulnerable to attacks since an adversary can masquerade 
a primary or a secondary user by emulating its signal. 
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Various security schemes have been proposed by researchers 
to detect and defend against such attacks. Some of the 
mechanisms are briefly discussed in the following. 
Chen and Park propose a security mechanism for 
defending against masquerading of a primary user by a 
malicious adversary (Chen & Park, 2006). The proposed 
scheme is based on a transmitter verification procedure that 
employs a location verification scheme to distinguish 
incumbent signals (i.e., signals from a primary user) from 
unlicensed signals masquerading as incumbent signals. 
Location verification is carried out using two approaches: (i) 
distance ratio test (DRT) using the received signal strength 
indicator (RSSI) of a signal source and (ii) distance 
difference test (DDT) using the relative phase difference of 
the received signal as the signal is received at different 
receivers. The authors assume that the location information 
of some of the nodes in the network is always known a priori 
since these nodes are either fixed or they use trusted global 
positioning system (GPS) information. These nodes perform 
DRT and DDT operations within their coverage areas and 
also serve as the location verifiers (LVs). The LVs exchange 
the location information of incumbent transmitters through a 
cognitive pilot channel. However, the difference in the radio 
propagation paths among the LVs which are used in DRT 
operation can make identification of attackers a very difficult 
task. The problem is even more critical in urban 
environments in which buildings and other tall structures 
frequently cause multipath fading in the wireless channels. 
However, DDT technique does not suffer from this problem 
and it is usually used to identify masquerading attack in CR 
networks.  
For identifying and isolating malicious users in a CR 
network, Zhao and Zhao propose a cooperative detection 
scheme (Zhao & Zhao, 2009). In the proposed scheme, the 
secondary users collaborate by exchanging and using 
decision fusion on the local decision results instead of using 
the detected energy. A mechanism of weighted coefficients is 
used which updates the weights of the coefficients 
recursively according to the deviations between separate 
decision information and the combined final results. The 
proposed scheme has lower complexity and better 
performance compared to the existing similar schemes as 
demonstrated by the simulation results.  
Zhao et al. present an identification mechanism of the 
nodes in a CR network using an analysis of the transmitted 
signals in which wavelet transform is used to magnify the 
fingerprints of the transmitter characteristics (Zhao et al., 
2010). This approach is based on PHY-layer authentication 
and can effectively prevent the PUE attack. The transmitter 
location fingerprints are extracted from the wireless medium 
in a multipath propagation environment and a wavelet 
transform is used to extract the characteristics of the 
fingerprints. An accurate extraction of signal fingerprints 
enables a reliable detection of the primary users. However, 
the radio propagation errors can increase the probability of 
false alarms. This may make the scheme unreliable in certain 
wireless environments. Moreover, if an attacker can 
successfully emulate the transmitter fingerprints, the security 
of the proposed scheme will be broken.  
Afolabi et al. have described a PHY layer attack model 
that exploits the adaptability and flexibility of CR networks 
(Afolabi et al., 2009). The authors also propose a waveform 
pattern recognition scheme to identify emitters and detect 
camouflaging attackers by using electromagnetic signature 
(EMS) of the transceiver. The EMS of a device is computed 
based on the distinctive behavior in the waveform being 
emitted by the components of the transceiver including the 
frequency synthesis systems, modulator sub-systems, and the 
RF amplifiers. EMS serves as a very reliable and accurate 
parameter for identification of a node. However, it may be 
difficult to maintain a database of EMSs of all the devices in 
a large network and the EMS of a device may change with 
the aging of the device. Therefore, the scheme may be 
unreliable in real-world deployment.  
Clancy and Khawar present sophisticated signals 
processing algorithms like cyclostationary analysis, 
classification engines, and signal feature extraction for 
identifying false signals in CR networks (Clancy & Khawar, 
2009). The authors focus on the use of unsupervised learning 
in feature-based signal classification, since this technique 
requires minimal pre-configuration in building cognitive 
radios. They have shown how self-organizing maps can be 
used for signal classification and have presented scenarios in 
which the output classes of the neural network are susceptible 
for manipulation by an attacker. Due to these possible 
manipulations, the attacker’s signals can be erroneously 
classified as those of the primary users by other users in the 
network. In this way, the attacker need not mimic the spectral 
properties of the primary users, yet its gets unrivaled access 
to the spectrum. The authors have also provided 
recommendations to mitigate the impact of the attack on the 
CR network. However, the proposed detection algorithms are 
too complex and computation-intensive for resource 
constrained sensor nodes in CWSNs.  
6.4 Roust authentication using cryptography 
Cryptographic techniques are most commonly used in 
authentication protocols for wireless networks. However, in 
CWSNs, authentication mechanism should be adaptable to all 
communication protocols with which the nodes have to 
interface. Hence, implementing authentication protocols for 
CWSNs poses significant design challenges. Over the last 
few years, this problem has attracted significant attention 
from the research community.  
Kuroda et al. present a radio-independent authentication 
framework for CR networks that is independent of the 
underlying radio protocols used and that can be integrated 
with the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) (Kuroda et 
al., 2007). The re-keying mechanism used in the 
authentication protocol uses user-specific information, such 
as location information, as the key seed. The keys used in 
encryption and authentication are derived from the historical 
location registry of the mobile device which is securely 
maintained in a trusted center. The keys are updated 
frequently based on the change in location of the devices. 
The authors also evaluate the confidentiality of the key 
management scheme and its integration related issues with 
EAP. The protocol is suitable for deployment in real-world 
networks since it allows fast switchover in CR network and 
does not need any communication with the authentication 
authorization and accounting (AAA) server for any re-
authentication of the CR nodes. 
The authentication protocols may have different 
implementations in different architectures of the C
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networks. While a network having a centralized CR 
architecture will usually deploy a centralized authentication 
server for authentication of the nodes and key management-
related functions, a distributed CR architecture will be ideally 
suited for distributed authentication approach, e.g. threshold 
authentication.  Capkun et al. propose a set of key 
management algorithms for a distributed mobile ad hoc 
network (MANET) following the approach in the pretty good 
privacy (PGP) algorithm, in which each node is responsible 
for creating its public and private keys (Capkun et al., 2003). 
The proposed scheme is a fully self-organized public key 
management system that allows users to generate their 
public-private key pairs, to issue certificates, and to perform 
authentication even in the event of transient network 
partitioning and without the presence of any centralized key 
management entity in the network. The key management 
scheme is distributed in its true sense since it does not require 
any trusted authority even at the time of system 
bootstrapping.  
Jakimoski and Subbalakshmi propose an efficient and 
provably secure protocol that can be used in a CR network to 
protect the spectrum decision process against a malicious 
adversary (Jakimoski & Subbalakshmi, 2009). The proposed 
protocol is to guarantee a secure spectrum decision process 
in a clustered infrastructure-based network where the 
spectrum decisions are made at periodic intervals. The 
decision in each cluster is taken independently of the 
decisions in other clusters. The protocol is provably secure 
and it can guarantee that a malicious outsider and a limited 
number of malicious or selfish insiders cannot make 
significant adverse impact on the spectrum decision results. 
The authors have also shown that the proposed protocol is 
more efficient than the solutions that are based on digital 
signatures or key establishment protocols.  
The CWSNs should also ensure authorization of the 
cognitive sensor nodes for transmitting specific spectrum 
bands or for performing specific network functions. The 
authorization is often conditional to the nature of the 
spectrum environment, i.e., the presence of primary users in 
the area. The authorization is needed to define the roles of 
the CR nodes in performing the CR functions in the network. 
For both authentication and authorization purposes, the CR 
nodes exchange authentication information (e.g., the 
certificates) through a common channel, which is usually the 
cognitive control channel (CCC).  Safdar and O’Neill 
propose a security framework for protecting the information 
exchanged over the CCC in a CR network (Safdar & O’Neill, 
2009). 
6.5   Prevention of unauthorized spectrum access 
Several propositions are made by researchers for defending 
attacks in which a malicious node accesses spectrum in a CR 
network and then either uses the spectrum selfishly or 
launches a DoS attack on the primary users. In the following, 
we provide a brief discussion on some of these schemes. 
Xu et al. present a framework known as TRIESTE 
(Trusted Radio Infrastructure for Enforcing SpecTrum 
Etiquettes) that ensures that radio devices can access the 
spectrum only according to their privileges (Xu et al., 2006). 
The framework is based on a trusted computing (TC) base or 
module in each CR node that enforces the policy rules for 
spectrum access and etiquettes defined in the XG Policy 
Language (XGPL). TRIESSTE has two levels of etiquette 
enforcement mechanisms. The first enforcement is through 
an on-board mechanism that ensures trustworthy radio 
operation by restricting any operation that attempts to violate 
the policies with the help of a component located in each CR 
node. In the second level, an external infrastructure 
consisting of spectrum sensors monitors the radio 
environment and reports the measurements to the spectrum 
policy agents. If any violation is detected at any CR node, an 
appropriate punishment policy is enforced on the offending 
node.  
A robust technique to prevent unauthorized spectrum 
access in CR network is presented in (NIAP, 2009). The 
proposed scheme is based on a reliable estimation of the 
level of the interferences created by the secondary users.   
Unauthorized spectrum sensing in a CR network can be 
prevented by deploying a spectrum monitoring system in the 
network. A typical spectrum monitoring system monitors the 
spectrum usage in a specific spatial region and over a range 
of frequencies, and identifies the wireless services and the 
nodes providing such services. However, design of an 
effective spectrum monitoring system is challenging since 
natural or man-made obstacles can change the features of the 
radio signal and identification of wireless services may be 
difficult if an attacker can successfully emulate a specific 
wireless service being provided in the network. To address 
these issues, spectrum monitoring systems are usually 
designed and distributed across a number of nodes in a CR 
network. Information on the wireless services in an area can 
be transmitted to a central monitoring location, which can, 
then, correlate the various inputs and check the received 
information against other data like the known position of the 
wireless services in the area and their source. The major 
drawback of this approach, however, is that the spectrum 
sensing capabilities and the amount of data which can be 
transmitted by the users’ devices could be of limited value 
because of various constraints in the nodes.  
Atia et al. propose a model to define an enforcement 
structure for defending against malicious attacks (Atia et al., 
2008) on a CR network. The ultimate goal of the work is to 
provide an efficient framework so that the primary user is 
able to distinguish between the uncertain background of 
wireless environmental losses and the presence of harmful 
and interference secondary users. In order to minimize 
interference from the secondary users, the authors propose 
the use of silence slots during which no secondary 
transmission is allowed and compliance to this norm is 
enforced at the device certification level. For identifying a 
device, the authors propose an approach in which the identity 
of a device is implicitly announced by the pattern of 
use/interference itself. While developing the enforcement 
framework, the authors note the following fundamental 
tradeoffs: (i) with the increasing number of potential users to 
be supported and increasing level of robustness in the system, 
the time required for detecting malicious users increases, (ii) 
if the system efficiency in terms of achievable utilization 
rates is to be increased, the timeliness will degrade, (iii) if a 
large number of distinct identities for potential users are to be 
supported, the cost becomes prohibitively large, and hence a 
gradual punishment mechanism is to be followed in which 
innocent bystanders may face false conviction for a short 
period of time. The authors also provide quantifications of 
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the all these three tradeoffs among the various system 
parameters.  
6.6 Defense against attacks on cognitive engine 
IEEE 802.22 standard provides a robust authentication and 
encryption scheme to mitigate attacks against the MAC layer. 
Various mechanisms have also been proposed by researchers 
for defending against attacks on the cognitive engines of a 
CR network.  
Perich and McHenry propose a policy-based spectrum 
access control system for the Defense Advanced research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) NeXt Generation (XG) 
communications program for mitigating the harmful 
interference caused by a malfunctioning device or a 
malicious user for a cognitive software defined radio (SDR) 
(Perich & McHenry, 2009). The authors propose two 
protection mechanisms for defending against attacks on the 
cognitive engine. In the first approach, the authors argue that 
the likely effect of a threat on a CR network is to disrupt the 
state machine of the CR network and to bring the CR device 
to an incorrect (i.e. faulty) state. Formal state-space 
validation, as done with cryptographic network protocols, 
can be applied to the state machine to ensure that a bad state 
is never arrived at. In the second approach, the authors 
propose that the beliefs of the cognitive engine should be 
constantly re-evaluated and compared to a priori knowledge 
(e.g., local spectrum regulations) or rules (e.g., the 
relationship between transmit power, propagation, and 
frequency). The authors also present the details of their 
experimental framework to illustrate the capability offered to 
radios for enforcing policies and the capability for managing 
radios and securing access control to interfaces changing the 
policies of the radio. 
In CR networks, reputation and trust-based schemes may 
be deployed to identify the CR nodes whose cognitive 
engines are not working as per the policies and rules of the 
network. Once these nodes are identified, appropriate 
security policies may be enforced to ensure that the nodes 
cannot access any network resources till their reputation 
values increase and reach a minimum acceptable value. 
6.7 Security mechanisms for cognitive control channels 
The cognitive pilot channel (CPC) of a CR network is a 
particularly vulnerable entity. The CPC is responsible for 
distributing the cognitive control messages to support the CR 
functions. The CPC is vulnerable to numerous attacks 
especially the DoS attack by jamming the control channel, 
and the saturation attack on the control channel.  
A popular protection mechanism against the jamming 
attack in a specific spectrum band of a CR network is to use 
frequency hopping. The CPC could use more than one 
spectrum band and “hop” around the spectrum bands to avoid 
a possible jamming attack. The trade-off is an increased 
complexity of the CR network as the CR nodes should be 
notified about the change in the frequency band of the CPC. 
If an attacker effectively monitors the CPC, it could “chase” 
the CPC band for every change and eventually cause 
continual adaptation and outage of service to the CR 
network. Another issue is the need to allocate various 
spectrum bands for CPC, which may not be acceptable by 
spectrum regulators. 
For designing an efficient anti-jamming coding technique, 
Yue et al. present two coding schemes for recovering lost 
packets transmitted through parallel channels (Yue & Wang, 
2009; Yue et al., 2007). The two coding schemes are known 
as rateless coding and piecewise coding. For piecewise 
coding, the authors present the optimal and several 
suboptimal designs methods to build short block codes with 
small number of parity checks. For cognitive radio 
applications, the authors consider two types of sub-channel 
selections – single uniform and general non-uniform. Under 
both these sub-channel selection strategies, the throughput 
and the goodput performance of the secondary nodes in a CR 
network employing either of the anti-jamming coding 
technique have been analyzed. The results show that both 
coding techniques provide reliable transmissions with a 
sustained high level of throughput. The piecewise coding 
when used with short codes provides better performance with 
smaller overhead under low to medium jamming condition. 
For non-uniform sub-channel selection strategy, the short 
code is found to enhance the throughput and goodput of the 
secondary transmission with anti-jamming piecewise coding 
while the rateless coding is found to provide similar or worse 
results when compared to the uniform case. Both these 
coding techniques can be applied for protecting the CPC of a 
CR network.  
Meucci et al. present a lightweight mechanism for 
achieving security in the PHY layer in a CR network using 
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) 
(Meucci et al., 2009). In this scheme, the user’s data symbols 
are mapped over the physical sub-carriers using a 
permutation strategy. The security in the PHY layer is 
achieved using a random and dynamic sub-carrier 
permutation which is based on a pre-shared information and 
also on the dynamic spectrum access (DSA) strategy used. 
The dynamic sub-carrier permutation is allowed to vary with 
time, change of geographical location and environmental 
status, providing a very high level of robustness and security. 
The proposed scheme is effective against eavesdropping 
attack even if the eavesdropper adopts a long-term pattern 
analysis. This mechanism can be adapted for protecting 
CCCs in a CR network although the computational overhead 
may be prohibitively high in a large-scale CWSN. 
6.8    Security using geo-location database  
In this approach, the CR network provider maintains a 
database of the positions and transmission characteristics 
(e.g., transmit power) of all the primary users in the network. 
The CR finds its own location information using a GPS and 
compares the data received from the spectrum sensing 
functionality with the known position of the primary users. 
Any anomaly in position information triggers an alert for a 
possible malicious attack. The database containing the 
information about the primary users and their location can be 
downloaded form an authenticated and trusted server in the 
network. 
Geo-locations-based security mechanisms in CR networks 
are simple and do not need sophisticated CR nodes for their 
operations. However, these techniques are vulnerable to 
security attacks on global navigational satellite systems 
(GNSS) such as spoofing, or lack of GNSS availability, 
especially in urban environments (e.g., urban canyons). Borth 
et al. have proposed a protection technique that is based on 
beacons emitted by the primary users wherein a primary user 
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would transmit a beacon to alert any secondary user to not 
transmit in specific spectrum bands (Borth et al., 2008). The 
disadvantage of this solution is that primary users should 
modify their equipment to provide the beacon transmission. 
Table 2 presents a summary of various possible attacks on 
CWSNs and their respective possible defense mechanisms. 
 
Table 2. Various security vulnerabilities in CWSNs and 
their corresponding defense mechanisms   
 
 
7. Emerging Research Directions  
Wireless technology is rapidly proliferating into all aspects of 
computing and communications. There are over 8 billion 
wireless devices in use today (mostly cell phones and mobile 
computers), and this number is expected to increase to about 
100 billion by the year 2025 (Steenkiste et al., 2009). This 
phenomenal growth in wireless usage will be driven by new 
applications that embed computing power into the physical 
world around us, helping us to make the world safer, smarter 
and more accessible. Radio technology will be at the very 
heart of the future computing world – one in which billions 
of communications, mobile devices and sensor/actuators are 
connected to the global Internet and serve as the foundation 
for many exciting new classes of applications. However, the 
anticipated exponential growth of the wireless devices and 
applications is contingent on our ability to design radio 
technologies that continue to work well with increasing 
deployment density – in particular, radio systems must 
change, and change rapidly, to cope with 2-3 orders of 
magnitude increase in density from 10-100 devices/km2 
today to 1000-10,000 devices/km2 in 2025. Given the fact 
that spectrum is a finite resource, this call for disruptive 
technology innovation in the radio field (Steenkiste et al., 
2009). Cognitive radios in general and cognitive wireless 
sensor networks in particular offer the promise of bring just 
this disruptive technology innovation that will enable the 
future wireless world. Although CWSN technology have 
already emerged from the early stage of laboratory trials and 
vertical applications supports to become a general-purpose 
programmable radio, there is still a big gap between having a 
flexible cognitive radio, effectively a building block, and the 
large-scale deployment of cognitive sensor networks that 
dynamically optimize spectrum use. Building and deploying 
a network of cognitive radios is a complex task. The research 
community working on cognitive radio networks need to 
understand a wide range of issues including smart antenna 
technology, spectrum sensing and measurements, radio signal 
processing, hardware architectures including (SDR) (Li et al., 
2009), medium access control (MAC), network discovery 
and self-organization, routing, adaptive control of 
mechanisms,   policy  definitions    and monitoring, and 
learning mechanisms. This is a very wide range of 
technologies to harness and apply, and hence understanding 
and properly controlling the behavior of the resulting system 
is a challenging research task. Given the complexity and 
multi-dimensional nature of the cognitive radio research, the 
following research challenges will be important in the 
immediate future: (i) designing a framework for spectrum 
policy alternatives and system models, (ii) designing smarter 
spectrum sensing algorithms, (iii) defining more efficient CR 
architecture and software abstractions, (iv) designing more 
efficient cooperative wireless communication systems, (v) 
design smarter algorithms for dynamic spectrum access, (vi) 
defining protocol architectures for cognitive networks, (vii) 
design of cognitive algorithms for adaptation and resource 
management, (viii) security and privacy issues, (ix) 
integration and inter-operability issues among CR networks 
and the Internet. 
Since the core focus of this paper is on the security and 
privacy issues in CWSNs, we identify some of the major 
security and privacy challenges which need attention from 
the research community and need to be addressed for large-
scale adoption of these networks for real-world deployments. 
With the advent of CR networks, programmability extends to 
the radio and hence it becomes possible to create a wide 
range of authorized and unauthorized waveforms with a low-
cost consumer device. It would then be relatively easy to 
create denial-of-service attacks that can affect critical 
applications such as traffic control or healthcare. The 
regulatory bodies need to be aware of these potential threats 
and work with industry to develop trusted hardware 
architectures, monitoring frameworks or other solutions to 
the security problems. Some of the issues that need attention 
in this regard are as follows: 
• What types of denial-of-service and other security 
attacks are made possible by emerging cognitive radio 
technology? 
• Software weaknesses are known to be a major security 
problem in the Internet today – what are the 
implications of increasingly software-based radio 
implementations? 
• How does one assure that CRs operate as intended 
and designed? Is there a trusted cognitive radio 
architecture which can address some of these security 
concerns? 
• What authentication mechanisms are needed to 
support cooperative cognitive networks? Are 
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reputation-based schemes useful supplements to 
conventional PKI authentication protocols? 
• How the current protection techniques for spectrum 
management and spectrum sharing functions can be 
further improved? What link protection techniques 
could be further incorporated in the current security 
frameworks? 
• How the performance efficiency of the different 
protection techniques used in collaborative spectrum 
sensing can be evaluated in real-world deployment 
scenario? 
• How to design and standardize tamper-resistant 
module to enforce spectrum regulation policies in 
CR nodes and SDR devices? 
At the same time, cognitive radios offer important new 
capabilities to defend against intrusions or denial-of-service 
attacks. The spectrum sensing and SDR capability of the 
radio make it feasible to employ recent developments in 
wireless security in which physical layer properties (such as 
RF signatures) are used for authentication or secure 
communication (Mathur et al., 2008). Also, spectrum 
scanning and agility associated with cognitive radios enable 
networks to move away from frequency channels 
experiencing denial-of-service attack. Location is another 
important feature of a wireless network, and information on 
geographic position can also be used to defend against 
certain types of attacks on cognitive networks. Some of the 
research issues which need to be addressed in this regard are 
as follows: 
• Identification of physical layer security enhancements 
for wireless networks, and evaluation of performance 
in real-world deployment scenarios. 
• Evaluation of denial-of-service attack scenarios and 
method for defense. 
• Use of geo-location for improved wireless network 
security 
• Cooperative methods for detecting and isolating 
intruders. 
While the ongoing research works on these issues are quite 
promising, evaluations have been mostly limited to lab 
environments, and it is not clear to what degree these 
techniques will be feasible in real-world deployments, or 
whether these algorithms, architectures and protocols will 
scale to high density environments. Large scale testing in the 
CR networks is mandatory for this purpose. Since the 
CWSNs are still in their pre-deployment phase, there is still 
an opportunity and a critical requirement to make security as 
an integral component of CR network architecture. This will 
require realistic practical evaluation of new techniques as 
they are designed and developed. 
8. Conclusion  
The cognitive radio paradigm introduces entirely new types 
of security threats to wireless networks in general and 
wireless sensor networks in particular. It makes the 
development of effective security models and mechanism 
very challenging. However, wireless security in cognitive 
radio networks is a technical area that has received relatively 
less attention, even though security will likely to play a key 
role in the long-term commercial viability of the technology. 
This paper has first introduced various security threats in 
traditional wireless sensor networks which are also applicable 
in cognitive wireless sensor networks. It has then identified 
various additional security threats which are applicable for 
cognitive wireless sensor networks and presented various 
challenges in defending against these security vulnerabilities. 
In addition to identifying various threats, the paper has also 
discussed various existing security mechanisms to defend 
against these threats and attacks. A comprehensive taxonomy 
of the attacks and their respective security schemes are also 
presented. Some key research challenges in CR networks 
particularly from the perspectives of security and privacy are 
identified and discussed briefly. These challenges need to be 
addressed in the near future by the research community in 
order to make deployment of CWSNs feasible in critical and 
sensitive real-world applications.  
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